Average voting rule

The average voting rule is a rule for group decision-making when the decision is a distribution (e.g. the allocation of a budget among different issues), and each of the voters reports his ideal distribution. This is a special case of budget-proposal aggregation. It is a simple aggregation rule, that returns the arithmetic mean of all individual ideal distributions. The average rule was first studied formally by Michael Intrilligator.[1] This rule and its variants are commonly used in economics and sports.[2][3]

  1. ^ Intriligator, M. D. (1973-10-01). "A Probabilistic Model of Social Choice". The Review of Economic Studies. 40 (4): 553–560. doi:10.2307/2296588. ISSN 0034-6527. JSTOR 2296588.
  2. ^ Rosar, Frank (2015-09-01). "Continuous decisions by a committee: Median versus average mechanisms". Journal of Economic Theory. 159: 15–65. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.010. ISSN 0022-0531.
  3. ^ Renault, Regis; Trannoy, Alain (May 2005). "Protecting Minorities through the Average Voting Rule". Journal of Public Economic Theory. 7 (2): 169–199. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9779.2005.00200.x. ISSN 1097-3923.