Battle of Savo Island

Battle of Savo Island
Part of the Pacific Theater of World War II

USS Quincy being illuminated by searchlights of Chōkai, on fire and sinking from Japanese torpedoes
Date8–9 August 1942
Location
Off Savo Island, Pacific Ocean
9°8′S 159°49′E / 9.133°S 159.817°E / -9.133; 159.817
Result Japanese victory
Belligerents
 Japan  United States
 Australia
Commanders and leaders
Gunichi Mikawa Richmond Turner
Victor Crutchley
Strength
5 heavy cruisers
2 light cruisers
1 destroyer[1]		 6 heavy cruisers
2 light cruisers
15 destroyers[1]
Casualties and losses
58 killed
2 heavy cruisers damaged
1 light cruiser damaged[1][a]		 1,077 killed
4 heavy cruisers sunk
1 heavy cruiser damaged
2 destroyers damaged[1][b]

The Battle of Savo Island, also known as the First Battle of Savo Island and in Japanese sources as the First Battle of the Solomon Sea (第一次ソロモン海戦, Dai-ichi-ji Soromon Kaisen), and colloquially among Allied Guadalcanal veterans as the Battle of the Five Sitting Ducks,[4][5] was a naval battle of the Solomon Islands campaign of the Pacific War of World War II between the Imperial Japanese Navy and Allied naval forces. The battle took place on 8–9 August 1942 and was the first major naval engagement of the Guadalcanal campaign and the first of several naval battles in the straits later named Ironbottom Sound, near the island of Guadalcanal.

The Imperial Japanese Navy, in response to Allied amphibious landings in the eastern Solomon Islands, mobilized a task force of seven cruisers and one destroyer under the command of Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa. The task forces sailed from Japanese bases in New Britain and New Ireland down New Georgia Sound (also known as "The Slot") with the intention of interrupting the Allied landings by attacking the supporting amphibious fleet and its screening force. The Allied screen consisted of eight cruisers and fifteen destroyers under Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley, but only five cruisers and seven destroyers were involved in the battle. In a night action, Mikawa thoroughly surprised and routed the Allied force, sinking one Australian and three American cruisers, while suffering only light damage in return. Rear Admiral Samuel J. Cox, director of the Naval History and Heritage Command, considers this battle and the Battle of Tassafaronga to be two of the worst defeats in U.S. naval history, with only the attack on Pearl Harbor being worse.[6][7]

After the initial engagement, Mikawa, fearing Allied carrier strikes against his fleet in daylight, decided to withdraw under cover of night rather than attempt to locate and destroy the Allied invasion transports. The Japanese attacks prompted the remaining Allied warships and the amphibious force to withdraw earlier than planned (before unloading all supplies), temporarily ceding control of the seas around Guadalcanal to the Japanese. This early withdrawal of the fleet left the Allied ground forces (primarily United States Marines), which had landed on Guadalcanal and nearby islands only two days before, in a precarious situation with limited supplies, equipment, and food to hold their beachhead.

Mikawa's decision to withdraw under cover of night rather than attempt to destroy the Allied invasion transports was primarily founded on concern over possible Allied carrier strikes against his fleet in daylight. In reality, the Allied carrier fleet, similarly fearing Japanese attack, had already withdrawn beyond operational range. This missed opportunity to cripple (rather than interrupt) the supply of Allied forces on Guadalcanal contributed to Japan's failure to recapture the island. At this critical early stage of the campaign, it allowed the Allied forces to entrench and fortify themselves sufficiently to defend the area around Henderson Field until additional Allied reinforcements arrived later in the year.[8]

The battle was the first of five costly, large-scale sea and air-sea actions fought in support of the ground battles on Guadalcanal, as the Japanese sought to counter the American offensive in the Pacific. These sea battles took place after increasing delays by each side to regroup and refit, until the 30 November 1942 Battle of Tassafaronga—after which the Japanese, eschewing the costly losses, attempted resupplying by submarine and barges. The final naval battle, the Battle of Rennell Island, took place months later on 29–30 January 1943, by which time the Japanese were preparing to evacuate their remaining land forces and withdraw.

  1. ^ a b c d Frank, 1990
  2. ^ Frank, 1990, p. 117.
  3. ^ Frank, 1990, p. 121
  4. ^ Leckie 2011 p35
  5. ^ Johnson, William Bruce. The Pacific Campaign in World War II: From Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal Archived January 3, 2014, at the Wayback Machine. London; New York: Routledge, 2006. ISBN 978-0-415-70175-4. p. 188.
  6. ^ "H-Gram 009: Savo Island". Naval History and Heritage Command. the naval battles around Guadalcanal were bookended with two of the worst defeats in U.S. naval history (Savo Island and Tassafaronga), eclipsed only by Pearl Harbor.
  7. ^ "H-013-1 The Battle of Tassafaronga". Naval History and Heritage Command. Thus ended one of the most ignominious defeats in U.S. Navy history, although technically Wright and TF-67 succeeded in their mission, since none of the supplies from Tanaka's destroyers made it ashore to starving Japanese troops on Guadalcanal.
  8. ^ Toland, John (1970). The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936–1945. Random House.


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