Bayes correlated equilibrium

Bayes correlated equilibrium
Solution concept in game theory
Relationship
Superset ofCorrelated equilibrium, Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Significance
Proposed byDirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris

In game theory, a Bayes correlated equilibrium is a solution concept for static games of incomplete information. It is both a generalization of the correlated equilibrium perfect information solution concept to bayesian games, and also a broader solution concept than the usual Bayesian Nash equilibrium thereof. Additionally, it can be seen as a generalized multi-player solution of the Bayesian persuasion information design problem.[1]

Intuitively, a Bayes correlated equilibrium allows for players to correlate their actions in a way such that no player has an incentive to deviate for every possible type they may have. It was first proposed by Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris.[2]

  1. ^ Cite error: The named reference unified was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  2. ^ Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen (2016). "Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games". Theoretical Economics. 11 (2): 487–522. doi:10.3982/TE1808. hdl:10419/150284.