Draft:Religious Sinicisation under the Xi Administration



Religious Sinicisation (from the prefix “Sinicise” meaning somebody or something modified under Chinese influence[1]) usually refers to ‘the indigenisation of religious faith, practice, and ritual in Chinese culture and society’.[2] Since Xi Jinping took office in 2012, the officially atheist Chinese Communist Party has tightened restrictions on religions.[3]

The party’s attitude towards religion dates back to the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, when early CCP leaders viewed religion as a potential threat, associating it with foreign influence, feudalism, and superstition.[4] During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Mao Zedong took on measures to eliminate religion which led to the widespread destruction of religious sites and persecution of believers.[5] Under Deng Xiaoping, the CCP shifted to a regulatory policy, aimed at managing religion and using its influence to achieve other party objectives, as well as to suppress any threat it might present to the party’s authority.[6] Given the apparent expansion of religion in Chinese society in recent decades, CCP leaders have responded with a combination of regulations and repression.[7]

The Xi administration has broadly followed a similar approach to religion and continued policies initiated by its predecessors.[8] However, religious policy under Xi Jinping can be distinguished from that of the Hu Jintao era in four key ways: a set of new, more restrictive legal instruments have been introduced, religious persecution targets have broadened, there is increased state interference in daily religious practices, and there are new forms of technological surveillance.[9]

In May 2015, Sinicisation entered the official discourse when Xi Jinping declared, at the Central United Front Work Conference, that religion in China should be adapted to align with socialist values and must adhere to the path of Sinicisation.[10] The theme of religious Sinicisation has grown more prominent in official discourse.[11] He further emphasised his strategy on religious Sinicisation in a speech in 2016.[12] This was followed up in 2018 by the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) approving the administrative, ideological, and legal frameworks for the policy of Sinicisation, with these measures coming into force on the 1st of February 2020.[13]

The CCP’s policy is an attempt to bring religions under state control and align them with Chinese culture.[14] The campaign particularly affects religions deemed ‘foreign’, such as Christianity and Islam.[15] Xi Jinping perceives these religions as susceptible to ‘Western values’ and extremism, which he considers to be a threat to his ruling objectives.[16]

The religious Sinicisation policy has three main focuses for the CCP to monitor and manage religion in China: bureaucratically, the CCP streamlines oversight of religion; ideologically, it reinforces Party influence over religious beliefs and practices; and legally, it provides the juridical framework to monitor and control the growth of religion and its influence in China.[17]  Religious Sinicisation requires patriotic education and public displays of loyalty to the CCP in churches, mosques, and temples. The leaders of Christianity and Islam are expected to ‘adjust their teachings and customs with Chinese traditions and “pledge loyalty” to the state’.[18] Thus, rather than adapting religion to Chinese culture and traditions it is about making religions subservient to CCP ideology.

  1. ^ Fangyi Cheng, ‘The Evolution of “Sinicisation”’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 31, no. 2 (April 2021): 321–42, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1356186320000681.
  2. ^ Tom Harvey, ‘“Sinicization”: A New Ideological Robe for Religion in China’, Oxford House Research, 21 December 2020, https://www.oxfordhouseresearch.com/sinicization-a-new-ideological-robe-for-religion-in-china/.
  3. ^ Donald E. MacInnis, trans., ‘The People’s Republic of China: Document 19: The Basic Viewpoint on the Religious Question during Our Country’s Socialist Period [Selections]’ (Orbis Books, 1989), https://original.religlaw.org/content/religlaw/documents/doc19relig1982.htm.
  4. ^ ‘10 Things to Know about China’s Policies on Religion’, Pew Research Center, 23 October 2023, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/10/23/10-things-to-know-about-chinas-policies-on-religion/.
  5. ^ Sarah Cook, The Battle for China’s Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance under Xi Jinping (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).
  6. ^ Cook.
  7. ^ Cook.
  8. ^ Cook.
  9. ^ Cook.
  10. ^ Weishan Huang, ‘Chapter 3 The Sinicization of Buddhism and Its Competing Reinventions of Tradition’ (Brill, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004465183_005.
  11. ^ John Dotson, ‘Propaganda Themes at the CPPCC Stress the “Sinicization” of Religion’, 9 April 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/propaganda-themes-at-the-cppcc-stress-the-sinicization-of-religion/.
  12. ^ Kuei-min Chang, ‘New Wine in Old Bottles’, China Perspectives 2018, no. 1–2 (1 June 2018): 37–44, https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.7636.
  13. ^ Harvey, ‘“Sinicization”’.
  14. ^ Nectar Gan, ‘Beijing Plans to Continue Tightening Grip on Christianity and Islam’, South China Morning Post, 6 March 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/2188752/no-let-chinas-push-sinicise-religion-despite-global-outcry-over.
  15. ^ Chang, ‘New Wine in Old Bottles’.
  16. ^ Chang.
  17. ^ Harvey, ‘“Sinicization”’.
  18. ^ Reem Nadeem, ‘Government Policy toward Religion in the People’s Republic of China – a Brief History’, Pew Research Center, 30 August 2023, https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2023/08/30/government-policy-toward-religion-in-the-peoples-republic-of-china-a-brief-history/.