Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company | |
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Argued January 15, 1991 Decided June 3, 1991 | |
Full case name | Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company |
Citations | 500 U.S. 614 (more) 111 S. Ct. 2077; 114 L. Ed. 2d 660; 1991 U.S. LEXIS 3023 |
Case history | |
Prior | 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988); vacated on rehearing en banc, 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990); cert. granted, 498 U.S. 809 (1990). |
Holding | |
Race-based use of peremptory challenges during jury selection in a civil trial between private litigants violates due process. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Kennedy, joined by White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, Souter |
Dissent | O'Connor, joined by Rehnquist, Scalia |
Dissent | Scalia |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. V |
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, 500 U.S. 614 (1991), was a United States Supreme Court case which held that peremptory challenges may not be used to exclude jurors on the basis of race in civil trials.[1] Edmonson extended the court's similar decision in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), a criminal case. The Court applied the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as determined in Bolling v. Sharpe (1954), in finding that such race-based challenges violated the Constitution.