Electoral list

A joint Politics and Economics series
Social choice and electoral systems
Social choice Mechanism design Comparative politics Comparison List (By country)
Single-winner methods Single vote - plurality methods First preference plurality (FPP) Two-round (US: Jungle primary) Partisan primary Instant-runoff UK: Alternative vote (AV) US: Ranked-choice (RCV) Condorcet methods Condorcet-IRV Round-robin voting Minimax Schulze Ranked pairs Maximal lottery Positional voting Plurality (el. IRV) Borda count (el. Baldwin) Antiplurality (el. Coombs) Cardinal voting Score voting Approval voting Majority judgment STAR voting
Proportional representation Party-list Apportionment Highest averages Largest remainders National remnant Biproportional List type Closed list Open list Panachage List-free PR Localized list Quota-remainder methods Hare STV Schulze STV CPO-STV Quota Borda Approval-based committees Thiele's method Phragmen's method Expanding approvals rule Method of equal shares Fractional social choice Direct representation Interactive representation Liquid democracy Fractional approval voting Maximal lottery Random ballot Semi-proportional representation Cumulative SNTV Limited voting
Mixed systems By results of combination Mixed-member majoritarian Mixed-member proportional By mechanism of combination Non-compensatory Parallel (superposition) Coexistence Conditional Fusion (majority bonus) Compensatory Seat linkage system UK: 'AMS' NZ: 'MMP' Vote linkage system Negative vote transfer Mixed ballot Supermixed systems Dual-member proportional Rural–urban proportional Majority jackpot By ballot type Single vote Double simultaneous vote Dual-vote
Paradoxes and pathologies Spoiler effects Spoiler effect Cloning paradox Frustrated majorities paradox Center squeeze Pathological response Perverse response Best-is-worst paradox No-show paradox Multiple districts paradox Strategic voting Lesser evil voting Exaggeration Truncation Turkey-raising Paradoxes of majority rule Tyranny of the majority Discursive dilemma Conflicting majorities paradox
Social and collective choice Impossibility theorems Arrow's theorem Majority impossibility Moulin's impossibility theorem McKelvey–Schofield chaos theorem Gibbard's theorem Positive results Median voter theorem Condorcet's jury theorem May's theorem Condorcet dominance theorems Harsanyi's utilitarian theorem
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An electoral list is a grouping of candidates for election, usually found in proportional or mixed electoral systems, but also in some plurality electoral systems. An electoral list can be registered by a political party (a party list) or can constitute a group of independent candidates. Lists can be open, in which case electors have some influence over the ranking of the winning candidates, or closed, in which case the order of candidates is fixed at the registration of the list.

Electoral lists are required for party-list proportional representation systems.

An electoral list is made according to the applying nomination rules and election rules. Depending on the type of election, a political party, a general assembly, or a board meeting, may elect or appoint a nominating committee that will add, and if required, prioritize list-candidates according to their preferences. Qualification, popularity, gender, age, geography, and occupation are preferences that may influence the committee's work. The committee's proposed list may then be changed in a selection meeting, where new candidates may be added, or existing candidates may be moved or removed from the list.^[1] When the internal process is over, the final list is made public. The list may be printed on the ballot paper cast by voters at the election, or on a separate voter information paper.