Embodiment theory speaks to the ways that experiences are enlivened, materialized, and situated in the world through the body. Embodiment is a relatively amorphous and dynamic conceptual framework in anthropological research that emphasizes possibility and process as opposed to definitive typologies.[1] Margaret Lock identifies the late 1970s as the point in the social sciences where we see a new attentiveness to bodily representation and begin a theoretical shift towards developing an ‘Anthropology of the Body.’[2]
Embodiment-based approaches in anthropology were born of dissatisfaction with dualistic interpretations of humanity that created divisions such as mind/body, nature/culture, and object/subject.[1][2] Within these dichotomies, the physical body was historically confined to the realm of the ‘natural’ sciences and was not considered to be a subject of study in cultural and social sciences. When the body was studied or considered in social science contexts employing these dualistic frameworks, it was treated as a categorizable, ‘natural’ object with little recognition of its dynamic or subjective potentialities.[1]
Embodiment theory has been developed and expanded by the work of many scholars, as opposed to being credited to a single thinker.[1] The work of Thomas Csordas and Margaret Lock marks some of the earliest explicit applications of embodiment theory in anthropology.[2][3][4] More recent edited volumes compiled by Margaret Lock, Judith Farquhar, and Frances Mascia-Lees provide a better window into current applications of embodiment theory in anthropology.[5][6] The theoretical background of embodiment is an amalgamation of phenomenology, practice theory, feminist theory, and post-structuralist thought.[7] Mary Douglas, Marcel Mauss, Pierre Bourdieu, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Judith Butler, and Michel Foucault are often cited as key precursory conceptual contributors to embodiment theory.[7]
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