Genocidal intent is the specific mental element, or mens rea, required to classify an act as genocide under international law,[1] particularly the 1948 Genocide Convention.[2] To establish genocide, perpetrators must be shown to have had the dolus specialis, or specific intent, to destroy a particular national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, in whole or in part. Unlike broader war crimes or crimes against humanity, genocidal intent necessitates a deliberate aim to eliminate the targeted group rather than merely displace or harm its members.[3][4]
The concept of genocidal intent is complex and has spurred significant legal debate, primarily due to the challenge of proving an individual’s intent to destroy a group without direct evidence.[5][6] International criminal tribunals, such as those for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, have relied on circumstantial evidence to infer intent, considering the scale, systematic nature, and targeting patterns of atrocities. Legal standards for genocidal intent have varied, with some rulings demanding dolus directus (direct intent to cause harm) and others allowing for dolus indirectus (foreseeable consequences accepted by the perpetrator). This discrepancy has influenced judicial outcomes, as seen in the acquittal of certain defendants under stringent intent requirements, leading some scholars to advocate for a knowledge-based standard to better facilitate genocide convictions.[7]
The debate surrounding genocidal intent also intersects with state accountability.[8] For instance, Canada’s National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls argued that state genocidal intent could be inferred through a pattern of conduct and policies targeting a specific group. The rigorous evidentiary standards for genocidal intent, however, remain a point of contention, as critics argue they hinder genocide prevention by setting a high threshold for intervention and prosecution.[9]
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