Gulf War air campaign

Gulf War air campaign
Part of the Gulf War
Date17 January 1991 – 23 February 1991 (5 weeks)
Location
Result

Coalition victory

  • Coalition gain air superiority within one week
  • Launch of the ground campaign
Belligerents
 United States
 United Kingdom
 Saudi Arabia
 Canada
 France
 Italy
 Iraq
Commanders and leaders
Chuck Horner
Norman Schwarzkopf
Colin Powell
Andrew Wilson
Bill Wratten
Khalid bin Sultan
Saleh Al-Muhaya
Saddam Hussein
Ali Hassan al-Majid
Strength
Over 2,780 fixed-wing aircraft[1] 1,114 fixed-wing aircraft (550 combat aircraft), numerous air defence systems
Casualties and losses
46 killed or missing
8 captured
75 aircraft ‒ 52 fixed-wing aircraft and 23 helicopters
10,000–12,000 killed[2]
254 aircraft lost on the ground[3]
36 aircraft shot down in air-air combat
several air defense systems
2,000–3,000 Iraqi civilians killed

Operation Desert Storm, the combat phase of the Gulf War, began with an extensive aerial bombing campaign by the air forces of the coalition against targets in Iraq and Iraqi-occupied Kuwait from 17 January 1991 to 23 February 1991. Spearheaded by the United States, the coalition flew over 100,000 sorties, dropping 88,500 tons of bombs,[4] widely destroying military and civilian infrastructure.[5] The air campaign was commanded by United States Air Force (USAF) Lieutenant General Chuck Horner, who briefly served as Commander-in-Chief—Forward of U.S. Central Command while General Norman Schwarzkopf was still in the United States. The British air commanders were Air Chief Marshal Andrew Wilson (to 17 November 1990) and Air Vice-Marshal Bill Wratten (from 17 November).[6] The air campaign had largely finished by 23 February 1991 with the beginning of the coalition ground offensive into Kuwait.

The initial strikes were carried out by AGM-86 ALCM cruise missiles launched by B-52 Stratofortress bombers,[7] Tomahawk cruise missiles[8] launched from U.S. Navy warships situated in the Persian Gulf, by F-117 Nighthawk stealth attack aircraft[8] with an armament of laser-guided smart bombs,[8] and by F-4G Wild Weasel aircraft as well as F/A-18 Hornet aircraft armed with HARM anti-radar missiles.[9] These first attacks allowed F-14 Tomcat, F-15 Eagle, F-16 Fighting Falcon, and F/A-18 Hornet combat aircraft to gain air superiority over Iraq and then continue to drop television-guided and laser-guided bombs.

Armed with a GAU-8 rotary cannon and infrared-imaging or optically guided AGM-65 Maverick missiles, USAF A-10 Thunderbolt IIs bombed and destroyed Iraqi armored forces,[8] supporting the advance of U.S. ground troops. United States Marine Corps close air support AV-8B Harriers employed their 25mm rotary cannon, Mavericks, cluster munitions, and napalm against the Iraqi dug-in forces to pave the way forward for the U.S. Marines breaching Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's defenses. The U.S. Army AH-64 Apache and AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters fired laser-guided AGM-114 Hellfire and TOW missiles which were guided to tanks by ground observers or by scout helicopters, such as the OH-58D Kiowa.[10] The Coalition air fleet also made use of the E-3A Airborne Warning and Control Systems and of a fleet of B-52 Stratofortress bombers.[8][9]

  1. ^ Cite error: The named reference CPGWIVIIIpg221 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  2. ^ Keany, Thomas; Eliot A. Cohen (1993). Gulf War Air Power Survey. United States Dept. of the Air Force
  3. ^ https://www.afhra.af.mil/Portals/16/documents/Airmen-at-War/Haulman-WhatHappenedIraqiAF.pdf?ver=2016-08-22-131410-023#:~:text=During%20Operation%20DESERT%20STORM%2C%20the,open%2C%20and%20141%20in%20shelters. [bare URL PDF]
  4. ^ Allen; Thomas, Berry F; Polmar, Norman (1991), War in the Gulf, Turner, p. 147.
  5. ^ Operation Desert Storm, Global security.
  6. ^ "No. 52589". The London Gazette (Supplement). 28 June 1991. p. 46.
  7. ^ "Desert Storm: 2nd Bomb Wing leads the air war". Air Force. 2016-01-14. Retrieved 2024-06-07.
  8. ^ a b c d e Boyne (2003), pp. 359, 360
  9. ^ a b Gross (2002), pp. 226–7
  10. ^ Gross (2002), p. 235.