Hamas has promoted Palestinian nationalism in an Islamic context.[73] While initially seeking a state in all of former Mandatory Palestine it began acquiescing to 1967 borders in the agreements it signed with Fatah in 2005, 2006 and 2007.[74][75][76] In 2017, Hamas released a new charter[77] that supported a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders without recognizing Israel.[78][79][80] Hamas's repeated offers of a truce (for a period of 10–100 years[81]) based on the 1967 borders are seen by many as being consistent with a two-state solution,[82][83] while others state that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.[84][85] While the 1988 Hamas charter was widely described as antisemitic,[86] Hamas's 2017 charter removed the antisemitic language and said Hamas's struggle was with Zionists, not Jews.[87][88][89][90] However, it has been debated whether this statement has reflected an actual change in policy.[91][92]
Cite error: There are <ref group=lower-alpha> tags or {{efn}} templates on this page, but the references will not show without a {{reflist|group=lower-alpha}} template or {{notelist}} template (see the help page).
^Gelvin 2014, p. 226: "As with Islamic political organizations elsewhere, Hamas offers its followers an ideology that appropriates the universal message of Islam for what is, in effect, a nationalist struggle."
^Cheema 2008, p. 465: "Hamas considers Palestine the main front of jihad and viewed the uprising as an Islamic way of fighting the Occupation. The organisation's leaders argued that Islam gave the Palestinian people the power to confront Israel and described the Intifada as the return of the masses to Islam. Since its inception, Hamas has tried to reconcile nationalism and Islam. [...] Hamas claims to speak as a nationalist movement but with an Islamic-nationalist rather than a secular nationalist agenda."
^Litvak 2004, pp. 156–57: "Hamas is primarily a religious movement whose nationalist worldview is shaped by its religious ideology."
^Lopez, Anthony; Ireland, Carol; Ireland, Jane; Lewis, Michael (2020). The Handbook of Collective Violence: Current Developments and Understanding. Taylor & Francis. p. 239. ISBN9780429588952. The most successful radical Sunni Islamist group has been Hamas, which began as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine in the early 1980s. It used terrorist attacks against civilians - particularly suicide bombings – to help build a larger movement, going so far as to emerge as the recognized government of the Gaza Strip in the Palestine Authority.
^Higgins, Andrew (24 January 2009). "How Israel Helped to Spawn Hamas". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 26 September 2009. Retrieved 25 January 2023. When Israel first encountered Islamists in Gaza in the 1970s and '80s, they seemed focused on studying the Quran, not on confrontation with Israel. The Israeli government officially recognized a precursor to Hamas called Mujama Al-Islamiya, registering the group as a charity. It allowed Mujama members to set up an Islamic university and build mosques, clubs and schools. Crucially, Israel often stood aside when the Islamists and their secular left-wing Palestinian rivals battled, sometimes violently, for influence in both Gaza and the West Bank. 'When I look back at the chain of events I think we made a mistake,' says David Hacham, who worked in Gaza in the late 1980s and early '90s as an Arab-affairs expert in the Israeli military. 'But at the time nobody thought about the possible results.' Israeli officials who served in Gaza disagree on how much their own actions may have contributed to the rise of Hamas. They blame the group's recent ascent on outsiders, primarily Iran. This view is shared by the Israeli government. 'Hamas in Gaza was built by Iran as a foundation for power, and is backed through funding, through training and through the provision of advanced weapons,' Mr. Olmert said last Saturday. Hamas has denied receiving military assistance from Iran.
^Seurat 2019, pp. 17–19: "Indeed, since 2006, Hamas has unceasingly highlighted its acceptance of the 1967 borders, as well as accords signed by the PLO and Israel. This position has been an integral part of reconciliation agreements between Hamas and Fatah since 2005: the Cairo Agreement in 2005, the Prisoners' Document in 2006, the Mecca Agreement in 2007 and finally the Cairo and Doha Agreements in 2011 and 2012."
^*Baconi 2018, pp. 114–116: "["Prisoners' Document"] enshrined many issues that had already been settled, including statehood on the 1967 borders; UN Resolution 194 for the right of return; and the right to resist within the occupied territories...This agreement was in essence a key text that offered a platform for unity between Hamas and Fatah within internationally defined principles animating the Palestinian struggle." *Roy 2013, p. 210: "Khaled Meshal, as chief of Hamas's Political Bureau in Damascus, as well as Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniyeh similarly confirmed the organization's willingness to accept the June 4, 1967, borders and a two-state solution should Israel withdraw from the occupied territories, a reality reaffirmed in the 2006 Palestinian Prisoners' Document, in which most major Palestinian factions had reached a consensus on a two-state solution, that is, a Palestinian state within 1967 borders including East Jerusalem and the refugee right of return."
^Baconi 2018, pp. 82: "The Cairo Declaration formalized what Hamas's military disposition throughout the Second Intifada had alluded to: that the movement's immediate political goals were informed by the desire to create a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders."
Halim Rane (2009). Reconstructing Jihad Amid Competing International Norms. p. 34. Asher Susser, director of the Dayan Centre at Tel Aviv University, conveyed to me in an interview that "Hamas' 'hudna' is not significantly different from Sharon's 'long-term interim agreement." Similarly, Daniel Levy, a senior Israeli official for the Geneva Initiative (GI), informed me that certain Hamas officials find the GI acceptable, but due to the concerns about their Islamically oriented constituency and their own Islamic identity, they would "have to express the final result in terms of a "hudna," or "indefinite" ceasefire," rather than a formal peace agreement."
Loren D. Lybarger (2020). Palestinian Chicago. University of California Press. p. 199. Hamas too would signal a willingness to accept a long-term "hudna" (cessation of hostilities, truce) along the armistice lines of 1948 (an effective acceptance of the two-state formula).
Tristan Dunning (2016). Hamas, Jihad and Popular Legitimacy. Routledge. pp. 179–180.
^Baconi 2018, p. 108: "Hamas's finance minister in Gaza stated that 'a long-term ceasefire as understood by Hamas and a two-state settlement are the same. It's just a question of vocabulary.'"
^Cite error: The named reference Alsoos was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^"Movement and Access Restrictions in the West Bank: Uncertainty and Inefficiency in the Palestinian Economy"(PDF). World Bank. 9 May 2007. Archived from the original(PDF) on 10 April 2010. Retrieved 29 March 2010. Currently, freedom of movement and access for Palestinians within the West Bank is the exception rather than the norm contrary to the commitments undertaken in a number of Agreements between GOI and the PA. In particular, both the Oslo Accords and the Road Map were based on the principle that normal Palestinian economic and social life would be unimpeded by restrictions
^Dupret, Baudouin; Lynch, Michael; Berard, Tim (2015). Law at Work: Studies in Legal Ethnomethods. Oxford University Press. p. 279. ISBN9780190210243. [It has been alleged that] Hamas cynically abuses its own civilian population and their suffering for propaganda purposes.