Interior lines

Interior lines[a] (as opposed to exterior lines) is a military term, derived from the generic term line of operation or line of movement.[1] The term "interior lines" is commonly used to illustrate, describe, and analyze the various possible routes (lines) of logistics, supply, recon, approach, attack, evasion, maneuver, or retreat of armed forces. Interior line strategies are based on the fact that lines of movement and communication within an enclosed area are shorter and safer than those on the outside. As the area held by a defensive force shrinks, the interior line advantage held by the defensive force increases.[2][3]

Skillful and comprehensive application of interior line tactics can, for a partially surrounded combat force, provide vital breathing space, greatly reduce time, effort, security, and secrecy of resupplies and redeployment, and decrease the number of casualties. These effects may have a great impact on morale and eventually prove decisive, as according to Napoleon Bonaparte: "in war morale forces are to physical three to one".[4][5]


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  1. ^ Michael D. Lundy (December 6, 2017). "Operations, chapter 5 - Passage of lines" (PDF). US Army. Retrieved May 4, 2020.
  2. ^ William O'Connor Morris (1895). Moltke a biographical and critical study. Рипол Классик. pp. 85–. ISBN 978-5-87074-092-8.
  3. ^ Alfred Higgins Burne (1946). Strategy as Exemplified in the Second World War: A Strategical Examination of the Land Operations. CUP Archive. pp. 17–. GGKEY:7F20S7AZG5P.
  4. ^ A General Biographical Dictionary: Comprising a Summary Account of the Most Distinguished Persons of All Ages, Nations, and Professions, Including More Than One Thousand Articles of American Biography ... A.V. Blake. 1845. pp. 1001–.
  5. ^ David T. Zabecki (27 September 2006). The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in The Operational Level of War. Routledge. pp. 66–. ISBN 978-1-134-25224-4.