 | This article includes a list of references, related reading, or external links, but its sources remain unclear because it lacks inline citations. (February 2008) |
| Jones v. United States | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued October 5, 1998 Decided March 24, 1999 | |
| Full case name | Nathaniel Jones v. United States of America |
| Citations | 526 U.S. 227 (more) 119 S. Ct. 1215; 143 L. Ed. 2d 311 |
| Case history | |
| Prior | Conviction and sentence affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, 116 F.3d 1487 (9th Cir. 1997); cert. granted, 523 U.S. 1045 (1998). |
| Holding | |
| The three subsections of the federal carjacking statute create three distinct criminal offenses that are subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial requirement. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Souter, joined by Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg |
| Concurrence | Stevens |
| Concurrence | Scalia |
| Dissent | Kennedy, joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Breyer |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. amend. VI; 18 U.S.C. § 2119 | |
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), is a United States Supreme Court case interpreting the federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119, to set forth three distinct crimes, each with distinct elements. The Court drew this conclusion from the structure of the statute, under which two subsections provided for additional punishment if the defendant inflicts more serious harm. The Court also distinguished Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), because that case allowed for sentencing enhancement based on a prior conviction.