Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. | |
---|---|
Argued October 10, 1938 Decided November 14, 1938 | |
Full case name | Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. |
Citations | 305 U.S. 111 (more) 59 S. Ct. 109; 83 L. Ed. 73; 1938 U.S. LEXIS 1137 |
Case history | |
Prior | Case dismissed in favor of defendant, Delaware district court, 1935; dismissal upheld, Circuit Court of Appeals, 1936; upon rehearing, dismissal vacated and mandate sent to district court, Circuit Court of Appeals, 1936; certiorari denied, U.S. Supreme Court (302 U.S. 733, 58 S.Ct. 120); injunction entered per mandate in favor of plaintiff, 1938, Delaware district court; mandate "clarified", Circuit Court of Appeals, 1938; certiorari granted, U.S. Supreme Court, 304 U.S. 586, 58 S.Ct. 1052. |
Holding | |
After a patent expires or becomes invalid, the patent holder cannot use unfair competition law to prevent a rival from selling goods of the same shape under the same (non-trademarked) name. | |
Court membership | |
| |
Case opinions | |
Majority | Brandeis, joined by Hughes, Stone, Roberts, Cardozo, Black, Reed |
Dissent | McReynolds, joined by Butler |
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that the Kellogg Company was not violating any trademark or unfair competition laws when it manufactured its own Shredded Wheat breakfast cereal, which had originally been invented by the National Biscuit Company (later called Nabisco). Kellogg's version of the product was of an essentially identical shape, and was also marketed as "Shredded Wheat"; but Nabisco's patents had expired, and its trademark application for the term "Shredded Wheat" had been turned down as a descriptive, non-trademarkable term.
The Court therefore "forcefully applied the principle that once a patent has expired, its benefits are to be freely enjoyed by the public."[1] Kellogg has been called possibly "the Supreme Court's most versatile and influential trademark decision."[2] It had a direct impact on the structure of the Lanham Act and is a "routine starting point for analysis in trademark opinions in lower courts."[2]