Kerensky offensive

Kerensky offensive
Part of the Eastern Front of World War I

The Kerensky offensive and its aftermath.
Date1–19 July 1917
Location
Galicia, Central Europe
Result Central Powers victory
Belligerents
Commanders and leaders
Units involved

Southwestern Front

German Empire/Austria-Hungary/Ottoman Empire Army Group Böhm-Ermolli

Strength
900,000[1] 260,000[2]
Casualties and losses
38,722[3]–58,329 casualties, including 6,905 killed;[4] other sources state 125,000[5]–200,000 casualties which included 40,000 killed, and 20,000 wounded[6][7]
42,726 deserters[8]		 82,000 casualties,[9] including 37,000 captured[10]

The Kerensky offensive (Russian: Наступление Керенского), also called the summer offensive, the June offensive (Russian: Июньское наступление) in Russia, or the July offensive in Western historiography, took place from 1 July [O.S. 18 June] to 19 July [O.S. 6 July] 1917 and was the last Russian offensive of World War I.[a] After the abdication of Emperor Nicholas II during the February Revolution, the Russian Provisional Government pledged to fulfill Russia's existing commitments to the Triple Entente, which included launching an offensive in the spring of 1917. The operation was directed at capturing Lemberg and the rest of Galicia from Austria-Hungary.

The Southwestern Front[b] of the Russian Army was tasked with the offensive, as it was the least affected by revolutionary agitation and would be mostly fighting Austria-Hungary, which had not fully recovered from the Brusilov offensive. The main attack was launched by the Seventh Army and Eleventh Army, which made a limited advance, though the Eleventh Army's Czechoslovak brigade notably captured the town of Zborov from the Austrians. Further to the south, General Lavr Kornilov's Eighth Army was more successful, pushing back the Austrian Third Army and creating a breach along the front that was 30 kilometres (19 miles) wide, leading to the capture of the towns of Kalush and Galich. Secondary attacks to assist the main offensive were also launched by the Russian Western, Northern, and Romanian Fronts in other locations, but they were mostly unsuccessful, with the exception of the one in the Romanian theater.

The advance in the first days was in large part due to the volunteer shock battalions that were recruited and organized by the Provisional Government in the spring of 1917. But they were too few in number to hold the line against a counterattack by German reinforcements, and the regular infantry were less reliable. The Russian forces were then pushed back after 19 July, losing all of the territory they had gained. The Germans and Austrians continued advancing into Russian territory by as much as 120 kilometres (75 miles). By the time the German counter-offensive was over on 5 August, nearly all of Eastern Galicia had been retaken by the Central Powers. The retreat of the Russian army eventually stopped, and Kornilov managed to stabilize the front by mid-August, but the failure of the operation eliminated the offensive potential of the Russian Army and increased support for the Bolsheviks among the troops.

The offensive was a disaster for Kerensky and the Provisional Government, contributing to the July Days and the Kornilov affair. General Kornilov, the leader of the most successful Eighth Army, was appointed the commander of the Southwestern Front, and then army supreme commander just days later, because Kerensky hoped he could restore discipline and order among the retreating troops. He also gained support from conservative circles, and in September they decided to launch a coup against the Petrograd Soviet. But the Kornilov coup failed when his troops refused to fight, and instead strengthened the revolutionary tendencies among soldiers. The collapse of the Provisional Government's popularity as a result of the offensive, and even more so after the Kornilov coup, was critical to the Bolsheviks increasing their influence over both the army and the Petrograd Soviet shortly before the October Revolution.

  1. ^ Stevenson 2017, pp. 158–170.
  2. ^ Heenan 1987, pp. 18–19.
  3. ^ Golovin 2014, p. 487.
  4. ^ Heenan 1987, pp. 117–124.
  5. ^ Oleynikov 2016, p. 243.
  6. ^ The Kerensky Offensive: A desperate operation that backfired (Archive)
  7. ^ Kerensky Offensive
  8. ^ Heenan 1987, pp. 126–128.
  9. ^ Oleynikov 2016, p. 260.
  10. ^ Holland Thompson, ed. (1920). "Military Operations During the Russian Revolution". The Book of History: The Greatest War. Vol. XVII. Grolier. pp. 715–725.


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