Lebanese Forces (militia)

Lebanese Forces
القوات اللبنانية
FounderBachir Gemayel
LeadersBachir Gemayel (1976–1982)
Fadi Frem (1982–1984)
Fouad Abou Nader (1984–1985)
Elie Hobeika (1985–1986)
Samir Geagea (1986–1994)
Dates of operation1976–1994
HeadquartersMilitary Council in Karantina, Beirut (until 1990)
Ghidras, Keserwan District (until 1994)
Active regionsEast Beirut, Mount Lebanon, Beqaa Valley, South Lebanon
IdeologyConservatism
Christian nationalism
Lebanese nationalism
Anti-communism
Maronism
Federalism
Factions:
Anti-Palestinianism
Anti-Arabism
Phoenicianism
Political positionRight-wing to far-right
StatusDisarmed
Size12,000 (1981) [1]
AlliesLebanon Lebanese Armed Forces (pro-government faction)
Lebanon Internal Security Forces
Israel Israel Defense Forces (until 1982)
Ba'athist Iraq Iraq
Army of Free Lebanon
South Lebanon Army
OpponentsLebanese National Movement
People's Liberation Army
Amal Movement
Al-Mourabitoun
PNO
SSNP-L
Tigers Militia (until 1980)
Marada Brigade
LFEC
Hezbollah
Lebanon Lebanese Armed Forces (pro-Aoun faction)
State of Palestine PLO
Syria Syrian Armed Forces
Battles and warsLebanese Civil War

The Lebanese Forces (Arabic: القوات اللبنانية, romanizedal-Quwwāt al-Lubnāniyya) was the main Lebanese Christian faction during the Lebanese Civil War. Resembling the Lebanese Front which was an umbrella organization for different parties, the Lebanese Forces was a militia consisting of fighters originating from the different right-wing parties. It was mainly staffed by Maronite Christians loyal to Bachir Gemayel, and fought against the Lebanese National Movement, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Syrian Armed Forces among others. The group gained infamy for their perpetration of the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre, which primarily targeted Palestinian refugees following Gemayel's assassination.

  1. ^ Snider, Lewis W. "The Lebanese Forces: Their Origins and Role in Lebanon’s Politics." Middle East Journal, vol. 38, no. 1, 1984, pp. 1–33. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4326725. & p. 13.