| Lorain Journal Co. v. United States | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued October 17, 1951 Decided December 11, 1951 | |
| Full case name | Lorain Journal Company, et al v. United States |
| Citations | 342 U.S. 143 (more) 72 S. Ct. 181; 96 L. Ed. 162 |
| Case history | |
| Prior | Injunction granted, 92 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1950); probable jurisdiction noted, 71 S. Ct. 743 (1951). |
| Court membership | |
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| Case opinion | |
| Majority | Burton, joined by unanimous |
| Laws applied | |
| Sherman Antitrust Act | |
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), is a decision of the United States Supreme Court[1] that is often cited as an example of a monopolization violation being based on unilateral denial of access to an essential facility although it in fact involved concerted action.[2] When the Lorain Journal monopoly over advertising in the Lorain, Ohio, area was threatened by the establishment of a competing radio station, the newspaper's publisher refused to accept advertising from those who advertised over the radio station and required them to advertise only in the Journal. The purpose of the publisher was to eliminate the competition of the radio station. The Supreme Court held that the publisher had attempted to monopolize trade and commerce in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and was properly enjoined from continuing its conduct.
- ^ Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
- ^ See. e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson, and Jonathan Hooks, The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under United States Antitrust Law, 70 Antitrust L.J. 443, 446–47 (2002) (characterizing it as "a unilateral refusal to deal" case). Actually, Lorain Journal involved agreements with reluctantly-acquiescent customers that they would not deal with a competitive radio station, as explained in the Background section.