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The majority favorite criterion is a winner-takes-all voting system criterion that says that, if only one candidate is ranked first by a over 50% of voters, that candidate must win.[1]
Some methods that comply with this criterion include any Condorcet method, instant-runoff voting, Bucklin voting, plurality voting, and approval voting.
The criterion was originally defined only for methods based on ranked ballots, so while ranked systems such as Borda fail the criterion under any definition, its application to methods that give weight to preference strength is disputed, as is the desirability of satisfying such a criterion (see tyranny of the majority).[2][3][4]
The mutual majority criterion is a generalized form of the criterion meant to account for when the majority prefers multiple candidates above all others; voting methods which pass majority but fail mutual majority can encourage all but one of the majority's preferred candidates to drop out in order to ensure one of the majority-preferred candidates wins, creating a spoiler effect.[5]
if there is some single alternative which is ranked first by a majority of voters, we shall say there exists a majority will in favor of that alternative, according to the absolute majority (AM) criterion.
This is true even if the members of the majority are relatively indifferent among a, b and c while the members of the minority have an intense preference for b over a. So the objection can be made that plurality or majority voting allows a diffident majority to have its way against an intense minority.
Borda count is sometimes described as a consensus-based voting system, since it can sometimes choose a more broadly acceptable option over the one with majority support.