Maurice Gamelin | |
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31st Chief of the Army Staff | |
In office 10 February 1931 – 20 May 1940 | |
Preceded by | Maxime Weygand |
Succeeded by | Jean de Lattre de Tassigny |
Personal details | |
Born | Paris, France | 20 September 1872
Died | 18 April 1958 Paris, France | (aged 85)
Parents |
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Alma mater | École Spéciale Militaire |
Military service | |
Allegiance | France |
Branch/service | French Army |
Years of service | 1891–1940 |
Rank | General |
Commands | 51st Infantry Brigade |
Battles/wars | |
Maurice Gustave Gamelin (French pronunciation: [mɔʁis ɡystav ɡamlɛ̃]; 20 September 1872[1] – 18 April 1958[2]) was a French general. He is remembered for his disastrous command (until 17 May 1940) of the French military during the Battle of France in World War II and his steadfast defence of republican values.
The Commander-in-chief of the French Armed Forces at the start of World War II, Gamelin was viewed as a man with significant intellectual ability. He was respected, even in Germany, for his intelligence and "subtle mind", though he was viewed by some German generals as stiff and predictable. Despite this, and his competent service in World War I, his command of the French armies during the critical days of May 1940 proved to be disastrous. Historian and journalist William L. Shirer presented the view that Gamelin used World War I methods to fight World War II, but with less vigor and slower response.[3]
Gamelin served with distinction under Joseph Joffre in World War I. He is often credited with being responsible for devising the outline of the French counter-attack in 1914 which led to victory during the First Battle of the Marne. In 1933 Gamelin rose to command the French Army and oversaw a modernisation and mechanisation programme, including the completion of the Maginot Line defences.
Édouard Daladier supported Gamelin throughout his career, owing to Gamelin's refusal to allow politics to play a part in military planning and promotion, and his commitment to the republican model of government; this was not a trivial matter at a time when Communists on the left and Royalists and Fascists on the right were openly advocating regime change in France.