Moore's paradox concerns the apparent absurdity involved in asserting a first-person present-tense sentence such as "It is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining" or "It is raining, but I believe that it is not raining." The first author to note this apparent absurdity was George E. Moore.[1] These 'Moorean' sentences, as they have become known, are paradoxical in that while they appear absurd, they nevertheless
The term 'Moore's paradox' is attributed to Ludwig Wittgenstein,[2] who considered the paradox Moore's most important contribution to philosophy.[3] Wittgenstein wrote about the paradox extensively in his later writings,[a] which brought Moore's paradox the attention it would not have otherwise received.[4]
Moore's paradox has been associated with many other well-known logical paradoxes, including, though not limited to, the liar paradox, the knower paradox, the unexpected hanging paradox, and the preface paradox.[5]
There is currently not any generally accepted explanation of Moore's paradox in the philosophical literature. However, while Moore's paradox remains a philosophical curiosity, Moorean-type sentences are used by logicians, computer scientists, and those working with artificial intelligence as examples of cases in which a knowledge, belief, or information system is not modified in response to new data.[6]
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