Operation Copperhead

Copperhead
Part of Operation Bodyguard
Map of Europe with several names marked with arrows
Copperhead formed one of the subordinate plans of Operation Bodyguard
Operational scopeStrategic deception
Location
Gibraltar, Algiers
Planned1944
Planned byDudley Clarke, London Controlling Section
ObjectiveTo confuse German intelligence as to the location of the proposed D-Day landings.
Date26 May 1944
Black-and-white photograph of a man wearing military beret and uniform
Clifton James, in the guise of Montgomery, 1944
Montgomery, photographed in 1943

Operation Copperhead was a small military deception operation run by the British during the Second World War. It formed part of Operation Bodyguard, the cover plan for the invasion of Normandy in 1944 and was intended to mislead German intelligence as to the location of General Bernard Montgomery. The operation was conceived by Dudley Clarke in early 1944 after he watched the film Five Graves to Cairo. Following the war M. E. Clifton James wrote a book about the operation, I Was Monty's Double. It was later adapted into a film, with James in the lead role.

The German high command expected Montgomery (one of the best-known Allied commanders) to play a key role in any cross-Channel bridgehead. Clarke and the other deception planners reasoned that a high-profile appearance outside the United Kingdom would suggest that an Allied invasion was not imminent. An appropriate look-alike was found, M. E. Clifton James, who spent a short time with Montgomery to familiarise himself with the general's mannerisms. On 26 May 1944, James flew first to Gibraltar and then to Algiers, making appearances where the Allies knew German intelligence agents would spot him. He then flew secretly to Cairo and remained in hiding until Montgomery's public appearance in Normandy following the invasion.

The operation did not appear to have any significant impact on German plans and was not reported high up the chain of command. It was executed some time before D-Day, and in the midst of several other Allied deceptions. German intelligence might have suspected a trick, or not attributed much importance to the visit.