Origins of the Six-Day War

The Six-Day War was fought between June 5 and June 10, 1967, by Israel and the neighboring states of Egypt (known then as the United Arab Republic, UAR), Jordan, and Syria. The origins of the war include both longstanding and immediate issues. At the time of the war, the earlier foundation of Israel, the resulting Palestinian refugee issue, and Israel's participation in the invasion of Egypt during the Suez crisis of 1956 continued to be significant grievances for the Arab world. Arab nationalists, led by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, continued to be hostile to Israel's existence and made grave threats against its Jewish population. By the mid-1960s, relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors had deteriorated to the extent that a number of border clashes had taken place.

In April 1967, Syria shot at an Israeli tractor ploughing in the demilitarized zone, which escalated to a prewar aerial clash. In May 1967, following misinformation about Israeli intentions provided by the Soviet Union, Egypt expelled UN peacekeepers who had been stationed in the Sinai Peninsula since the Suez conflict,[1] and announced a blockade of Israel's access to the Red Sea (international waters) via the Straits of Tiran, which Israel considered an act of war. Tension escalated, with both sides' armies mobilising. Less than a month later, Israel launched a surprise strike which began the Six-Day War.

The conventional view has long suggested that Israel's actions leading into the war were prudent, laying the blame for the war on Egypt. According to political scientist Zeev Maoz, most scholarly studies now attribute the crisis to a complicated process of unwanted escalation, which all sides wanted to prevent, but for which all were ultimately responsible.[2] Nasser knew that his blockade of the Straits of Tiran from Israeli vessel passage, on 23 May 1967, might very likely provide Israel with reason to launch an attack.[3] His decisions to ask for the removal of the UN peacekeepers from Sinai and especially to block the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping via the Straits of Tiran are commonly accepted as the point where war became inevitable.[3][4] Many commentators consider the war as the classic case of anticipatory attack in self-defense,[5][6] but some 21st century historians contest the view that Israel acted in self-defense.[7]

  1. ^ United Nations General Assembly Special Report Report of the Secretary-General on the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force A/6730 and Add.1/3 26 June 1967. Retrieved 2 March 2015.
  2. ^ Maoz, Zeev. Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security & Foreign Policy, p. 111 (University of Michigan Press, 2009): "It is most important to reiterate the conclusion of most scholarly accounts of the crisis: this was a process of unwanted escalation, which everybody wanted to prevent, but all were responsible for making this escalation unavoidable."
  3. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference Bickerton2009P111 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  4. ^ Cite error: The named reference Ferris2012p286 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  5. ^ Cite error: The named reference Szabo2011p147 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  6. ^ Cite error: The named reference Quigley2012p135 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  7. ^ Cite error: The named reference Quigley2012p134-5 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).