Patterson v. New York | |
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Argued March 1, 1977 Decided June 17, 1977 | |
Full case name | Patterson v. New York |
Citations | 432 U.S. 197 (more) 97 S. Ct. 2319, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 120 |
Holding | |
Shifting the burden of proof for a mitigating circumstance affirmative defense to the defendant does not violate the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | White, joined by Burger, Stewart, Blackmun, Stevens |
Dissent | Powell, joined by Brennan, Marshall |
Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. | |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV |
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), was a legal case heard by the Supreme Court of the United States that stated that the Due Process Clause Fourteenth Amendment did not prevent the burdening of a defendant to prove the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance as defined by law in the state of New York.
The court found that the State of New York had reclassified provocation ("extreme emotional disturbance") as an excuse (an affirmative defense requiring proof by preponderance of the evidence), rather than mens rea, which the prosecution had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, as was the situation in Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975).[1]: 18