Peter Cramton | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Born | November 12, 1957 |
| Nationality | American |
| Spouse | Catherine Durnell Cramton |
| Academic background | |
| Education | Cornell University (BS) Stanford University (PhD) |
| Thesis | The Role of Time and Information in Bargaining (1984) |
| Doctoral advisor | Robert Wilson |
| Academic work | |
| Discipline | Economist |
| Sub-discipline | Auctions and Market Design |
| Institutions | University of Maryland since 1993 University of Cologne since 2018 |
Peter Cramton is an American economist and academic. He is Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland, Emeritus since 2018, and holds the Market Design Chair in Economics at the University of Cologne.[1]
Cramton's research has focused on three related areas. The first is bargaining theory where he studies the role time and information play in determining bargaining outcomes. The second is auction theory and practice, where he examines the auctioning of interrelated items, such as radio spectrum, electricity, financial securities, rough diamonds, airport slots, and top-level domains. His work in bargaining and auctions is closely tied to his third theme: market design. His market design work concerns communications, energy, finance, transportation, and health industries.[2]
Cramton has written over one hundred articles. As of 2020, his work has been cited over 14,400 times according to Google Scholar. His best known publications are: "Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty", "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently, Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty", "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data, The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment", "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions", and "The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response".[3]