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The quota methods are a family of apportionment rules, i.e. algorithms for distributing the seats in a legislative body among a number of administrative divisions. The quota methods are based on calculating a fixed electoral quota, i.e. a given number of votes needed to win a seat. These rules are typically contrasted with the more popular highest averages methods (also called divisor methods).[1] This is used to calculate each party's seat entitlement. Every party is assigned the integer portion of this entitlement, and any seats left over are distributed according to a specified rule.
By far the most common quota method is the largest remainders or quota-shift method, which assigns any leftover seats to the "plurality" winners (those parties with the largest remainders, i.e. most leftover votes).[2] When using the Hare quota, the method is called Hamilton's method, and is the third-most common apportionment rule worldwide (after Jefferson's method and Webster's method).[1]
Despite their intuitive definition, quota methods are generally disfavored by social choice theorists as a result of apportionment paradoxes.[1][3] In particular, the largest remainder methods exhibit the no-show paradox, i.e. voting for a party can cause it to lose seats, by increasing the size of the electoral quota.[3][4] The largest remainders methods are also vulnerable to spoiler effects and can fail resource or house monotonicity, which says that increasing the number of seats in a legislature should not cause a state to lose a seat (a situation known as an Alabama paradox).[3][4]: Cor.4.3.1