| Rhode Island v. Innis | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued October 30, 1979 Decided May 12, 1980 | |
| Full case name | State of Rhode Island, Petitioner, v. Thomas J. Innis |
| Citations | 446 U.S. 291 (more) 100 S. Ct. 1682; 64 L. Ed. 2d 297; 1980 U.S. LEXIS 94 |
| Case history | |
| Prior | Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
| Holding | |
| Interrogation under Miranda is defined as any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Stewart, joined by White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist |
| Concurrence | White |
| Concurrence | Burger |
| Dissent | Marshall, joined by Brennan |
| Dissent | Stevens |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. amend. V | |
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), is a decision by the United States Supreme Court that clarifies what constitutes "interrogation" for the purposes of Miranda warnings. Under Miranda v. Arizona, police are forbidden from interrogating a suspect once he has asserted his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. In Innis, the court held that interrogation is not just direct questioning but also its "functional equivalent"; namely, "any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response."