Scantegrity


Scantegrity is a security enhancement for optical scan voting systems, providing such systems with end-to-end (E2E) verifiability of election results. It uses confirmation codes to allow a voter to prove to themselves that their ballot is included unmodified in the final tally. The codes are privacy-preserving and offer no proof of which candidate a voter voted for. Receipts can be safely shown without compromising ballot secrecy.[1]

Scantegrity II prints the confirmation codes in invisible ink to improve usability and dispute resolution. As the system relies on cryptographic techniques, the ability to validate an election outcome is both software independent as well as independent of faults in the physical chain-of-custody of the paper ballots. The system was developed by a team of researchers including cryptographers David Chaum and Ron Rivest.

  1. ^ Chaum, David; Aleks Essex; Richard T. Carback III; Jeremy Clark; Stefan Popoveniuc; Alan T. Sherman; Poorvi Vora (May–June 2008), "Scantegrity: End-to-End Voter Verifiable Optical-Scan Voting" (PDF), IEEE Security & Privacy, 6 (6:3): 40–46, doi:10.1109/MSP.2008.70, S2CID 1149973, archived from the original (PDF) on 2016-01-16, retrieved 2016-11-23