United States v. Booker | |
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Argued October 4, 2004 Decided January 12, 2005 | |
Full case name | United States v. Freddie J. Booker; United States v. Ducan Fanfan |
Docket no. | 04-104 |
Citations | 543 U.S. 220 (more) 125 S. Ct. 738; 160 L. Ed. 2d 621; 2005 U.S. LEXIS 628; 73 U.S.L.W. 4056; 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 70 |
Case history | |
Prior | Recommendation to deny motion to quash, No. 03-026, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24609 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 5, 2003); defendant convicted, sentenced, W.D. Wis; sentence reversed and remanded, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 542 U.S. 956 (2004). |
Subsequent | Amended January 24, 2005. On remand, defendant resentenced, W.D. Wis.; affirmed, 149 Fed. Appx. 517 (7th Cir. 2005) |
Holding | |
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Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Stevens (in part), joined by Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg |
Majority | Breyer (in part), joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg |
Dissent | Stevens (in part), joined by Souter; Scalia (except Part III and footnote 17) |
Dissent | Scalia (in part) |
Dissent | Thomas (in part) |
Dissent | Breyer (in part), joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. VI; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3742 |
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), is a United States Supreme Court decision on criminal sentencing. The Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial requires that other than a prior conviction, only facts admitted by a defendant or proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury may be used to calculate a sentence exceeding the prescribed statutory maximum sentence, whether the defendant has pleaded guilty or been convicted at trial. The maximum sentence that a judge may impose is based upon the facts admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.[1]
In its majority decision, the Court struck down the provision of the federal sentencing statute that required federal district judges to impose a sentence within the United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines range, along with the provision that deprived federal appeals courts of the power to review sentences imposed outside the range. The Court instructed federal district judges to impose a sentence with reference to a wider range of sentencing factors set forth in the federal sentencing statute, and it directed federal appeals courts to review criminal sentences for "reasonableness," which the Court left undefined.
The ruling was the direct consequence of the Court's ruling six months earlier in Blakely v. Washington, in which the Court had imposed the same requirement on a guidelines sentencing scheme employed in Washington state.[2] Blakely arose out of Apprendi v. New Jersey in which the Court held that except for a prior conviction, any fact that increases the defendant's punishment above the statutory maximum punishment must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.[3]