User:Shapeyness/sandbox/Explanatory indispensability argument

The explanatory indispensability argument^[a] is an altered form of the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument in the philosophy of mathematics. It claims that we should believe in mathematical objects such as numbers because they are indispensable to scientific explanations of empirical phenomena.

^ Baker 2016a, p. 225; Pincock 2023, p. 61.
^ Hunt 2016, pp. 452–453; Bangu 2012, pp. 150–151, see also note 8 on p. 226.

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[FOOTNOTEBaker2016a225Pincock202361-1] Baker 2016a, p. 225; Pincock 2023, p. 61.

[FOOTNOTEHunt2016452–453Bangu2012pp._150–151,_see_also_note_8_on_p._226-2] Hunt 2016, pp. 452–453; Bangu 2012, pp. 150–151, see also note 8 on p. 226.

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