Dilthey has often been considered an empiricist,[7] in contrast to the idealism prevalent in Germany at the time, but his account of what constitutes the empirical and experiential differs from British empiricism and positivism in its central epistemological and ontological assumptions, which are drawn from German literary and philosophical traditions.
^Jack Martin, Jeff Sugarman, Kathleen L. Slaney (eds.), The Wiley Handbook of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology: Methods, Approaches, and New Directions for Social Sciences, Wiley Blackwell, p. 56.
^Peter Koslowski (ed.), The Discovery of Historicity in German Idealism and Historism, Springer, 2006, p. 4.
^Scott Campbell, Paul W. Bruno (eds.), The Science, Politics, and Ontology of Life-Philosophy, Bloomsbury, 2013, p. 8.
^ abcdefWilhelm Dilthey, Selected Works, Volume IV: Hermeneutics and the Study of History, Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 28.
^Cite error: The named reference SEP was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
^Krech, Eva-Maria; Stock, Eberhard; Hirschfeld, Ursula; Anders, Lutz Christian (2009). Deutsches Aussprachewörterbuch [German Pronunciation Dictionary] (in German). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. pp. 446, 1055. ISBN978-3-11-018202-6.
^Hans Peter Rickman, Wilhelm Dilthey, Pioneer of the Human Studies, University of California Press, 1979, p. 53.