Zangezur corridor

Since the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijan and Turkey have been promoting the concept of "Zangezur corridor", which, if implemented, would connect Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan through Armenia's Syunik Province.

The Zangezur corridor[a] (Armenian: Զանգեզուրի միջանցք, romanized: Zangezuri mijantsk; Azerbaijani: Zəngəzur dəhlizi) is a concept for a transport corridor[9][10] which, if implemented, would give Azerbaijan unimpeded access to Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic without Armenian checkpoints[11][12] via Armenia's Syunik Province[13] and, in a broad sense, for the geopolitical corridor[14] that would connect Turkey to the rest of the Turkic world thereby "uniting it".[15][16] The concept was not part of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement but was introduced to geopolitical lexicon later by Ilham Aliyev.[17] It has since been promoted by Azerbaijan and Turkey,[18] while Armenia has steadily objected to it, asserting that "corridor logic" deviates from the ceasefire statement, and that it is a form of propaganda.[19]

The terminology, the potential routes, and the modes of transport connections have since been points of contention between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which are still maintaining a mutual blockade since 1989.[b] Azerbaijan has initiated construction projects on its territory presenting them as part of the implementation of a so-called "Zangezur corridor" and threatened that should Armenia not want it, Azerbaijan "will decide it by force".[21]

During 2021 trilateral talks, Armenia expressed willingness to participate in rebuilding the Soviet-era railway links historically connecting Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan, which Azerbaijan interpreted as Armenian consent to the "Zangezur corridor". According to Russia, the third party, what is being discussed is unblocking regional communications, and not creating a "corridor".[22][23]

Various international observers have characterized the "Zangezur corridor" as a pan-Turkist agenda, drawing from irredentism, while others have emphasized the solution to the blockade as a key aspect. Certain political analysts have emphasized Russia's interest in its development, given that it would ostensibly be the security guarantor of the route.[24]

  1. ^ Ismayilova, Vafa (31 May 2021). "President Aliyev: Zangazur corridor to boost connectivity with Turkey". AzerNews. Archived from the original on 10 June 2021. Retrieved 10 June 2021.
  2. ^ "Azerbaijani President: when Zangazur corridor opens, it will open new opportunities for all the countries of the region". Azeri Press Agency. 20 May 2021. Archived from the original on 10 June 2021. Retrieved 10 June 2021.
  3. ^ Cite error: The named reference :0 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  4. ^ Bayramova, Aynur (3 February 2021). "Azerbaijani, Turkish officials to discuss Nakhchivan corridor". Report Information Agency. Archived from the original on 10 June 2021. Retrieved 10 June 2021.
  5. ^ "Armenia 2nd President Kocharyan on "Meghri corridor" plan: Not beneficial to us now to discuss it as "corridor"". News.am. 28 May 2021. Archived from the original on 10 June 2021. Retrieved 10 June 2021.
  6. ^ Yakish, Yashar (24 January 2021). "Moscow summit on Karabakh". Azerbaijan In Focus. Archived from the original on 10 June 2021. Retrieved 10 June 2021.
  7. ^ ""The November 9 statement makes no mention of Zangezur, Syunik corridor" - PM holds consultation in Syunik Marz administration". Prime Minister of Armenia. 21 April 2021. Archived from the original on 10 June 2021. Retrieved 10 June 2021.
  8. ^ Hovsepyan, Gayane (20 May 2021). "Pashinyan says Baku seeking to influence June parliamentary election". Hetq Online. Archived from the original on 10 June 2021. Retrieved 10 June 2021.
  9. ^ "Azerbaijan Embarks on Construction of Nakhchivan Railway (Part Two)". Jamestown Foundation. Archived from the original on 17 October 2021. Retrieved 17 October 2021.
  10. ^ "The 'Zangezur Corridor' is a geo-economic revolution". Emerging Europe. 17 May 2021. Archived from the original on 17 October 2021. Retrieved 17 October 2021.
  11. ^ Cite error: The named reference :3 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  12. ^ de Waal, Thomas. "In the South Caucasus, Can New Trade Routes Help Overcome a History of Conflict?". Carnegie Europe. Archived from the original on 3 January 2022. Retrieved 30 December 2021.
  13. ^ "Южные ворота Карабаха. Что происходит в Гадруте после войны". РИА Новости. 23 May 2021. Archived from the original on 23 May 2021. Retrieved 24 May 2021.
  14. ^ "The Meghri Corridor: A Viable Transport Link or Geopolitical Noose?". 22 March 2021. Archived from the original on 5 November 2021. Retrieved 17 October 2021.
  15. ^ Սարգսյան, Տաթևիկ (27 October 2021). ""Օր կգա, երբ մենք Զանգեզուրից կկարողանանք հասնել մինչև Ստամբուլ". Էրդողան" ["A day will come when we will be able to reach Istanbul from Zangezur." – Erdogan]. «Ազատ Եվրոպա/Ազատություն» Ռադիոկայան. Archived from the original on 28 October 2021. Retrieved 28 October 2021.
  16. ^ "Ilham Aliyev: Zangezur Corridor will unite the entire Turkic world". morningexpress.in. 12 November 2021. Archived from the original on 13 November 2021. Retrieved 13 November 2021.
  17. ^ Cite error: The named reference AzAnnounces was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  18. ^ "In Karabakh, Turkish and Azerbaijani leaders cement alliance". Eurasianet. 16 June 2021. Archived from the original on 16 June 2021. Retrieved 16 June 2021.
  19. ^ "Armenian-Azerbaijani border crisis: latest developments". Caucasus Watch. 17 May 2021. Archived from the original on 27 November 2021. Retrieved 16 October 2021.
  20. ^ "Azerbaijan starts using Armenian airspace". Eurasianet. 6 October 2021. Archived from the original on 8 October 2021. Retrieved 9 January 2022.
  21. ^ "What will become of the Zangezur corridor? Comments from Azerbaijan and Armenia - JAMnews". 21 April 2021. Archived from the original on 15 June 2021. Retrieved 14 November 2021.
  22. ^ Babayan, Aza (20 October 2021). "Armenian, Azeri Officials Hold More Talks In Moscow". «Ազատ Եվրոպա/Ազատություն» Ռադիոկայան. Archived from the original on 21 October 2021. Retrieved 24 October 2021.
  23. ^ "Вопрос о коридоре в Нахчыван через Армению не обсуждается - Оверчук" [The issue of a corridor to Nakhchivan through Armenia is not being discussed – Overchuk]. interfax.az. Archived from the original on 7 November 2021. Retrieved 7 November 2021.
  24. ^ Mgdesyan, Arshaluis (14 September 2022). "Attacks on Armenia highlight ongoing disputes over "corridor" for Azerbaijan". Eurasianet. Archived from the original on 5 June 2023. Retrieved 31 May 2023. Russia has an additional interest in the outcome, given that it is supposed to be the security guarantor of the new route said Sergey Markedonov, a Caucasus analyst at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Russian Foreign Ministry....Aram Sargsyan, a Pashinyan ally and head of the Hanrapetutyun Party, agreed that Russia has its own interests in making sure some kind of road gets established. "In this way it will control two vital corridors at once – connecting Armenia with Karabakh and Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan – thereby increasing these countries' dependence on it," he told Eurasianet.


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