1956 Georgian demonstrations | |||
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Part of De-Stalinization | |||
Date | 4–10 March 1956 | ||
Location | |||
Caused by | Resistance to de-Stalinization | ||
Goals | Defence of Stalin's legacy and of Georgian national identity | ||
Methods | Protest march, picketing, rioting | ||
Resulted in | Destabilization of the city and subsequent repression of the protests by Soviet military authorities | ||
Parties | |||
Lead figures | |||
Nikita Khrushchev | |||
Casualties and losses | |||
Part of a series on the |
History of Georgia |
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The March 1956 demonstrations (also known as the 1956 Tbilisi riots or 9 March massacre) in the Georgian SSR were a series of protests against Nikita Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policy, which shocked Georgian supporters of Stalinist ideology. The center of the protests was the republic's capital, Tbilisi, where spontaneous rallies to mark the third anniversary of Stalin's death and to protest Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin commencing on 4 March quickly evolved into an uncontrollable mass demonstration and rioting which paralyzed the city. Soon, political demands such as the change of the central government in Moscow and calls for the independence of Georgia from the Soviet Union appeared.[2]
The local Georgian authorities, confused and demoralized, passed on the responsibility to the Soviet military. Later on 9 March the troops deployed in the city opened fire upon the students picketing the government buildings in what the official Soviet version held was "an act of self-defense".[3] The agitated crowds continued resistance on 10 March but were eventually dispersed by tanks. Estimates of the number of casualties range from several dozens to several hundred.[4][5]
In spite of prompt pacification, the 1956 events marked a turning point after which Georgian loyalty to the Soviet Union was gravely compromised and the nation's consolidation intensified.[5] In the view of the historian Ronald Grigor Suny, "the swift and brutal response from the Soviet government illustrated starkly its inability to resolve the dilemma of how much of the Soviet system to change and how much of Stalin's authoritarianism to preserve. The government's confusion in Tbilisi was a bloody sign that reform was to be limited by the party's determination to preserve its essential monopoly of power."[4]