1991 Yugoslav campaign in Croatia

1991 Yugoslav campaign in Croatia
Part of the Croatian War of Independence
(clockwise from top left)
Date20 September 1991 – 3 January 1992
Location
Result Yugoslav Peoples Army victory[1]
Territorial
changes
Republic of Serbian Krajina formed as a self-proclaimed Serb proto-state from Croatia
Belligerents
 SFR Yugoslavia
SAO Krajina
SAO Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Syrmia
SAO Western Slavonia
 Croatia
Commanders and leaders
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Veljko Kadijević
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Blagoje Adžić
Slobodan Milošević
Socialist Republic of Montenegro Momir Bulatović
Socialist Republic of Montenegro Milo Đukanović
Socialist Republic of Montenegro Pavle Bulatović
Željko Ražnatović
Croatia Franjo Tuđman
Croatia Gojko Šušak
Croatia Martin Špegelj
Croatia Anton Tus
Units involved

Yugoslav People's Army

Serb Volunteer Guard
White Eagles
Serbian Guard
Dušan the Mighty

Croatian National Guard (until November 1991)
Armed Forces of Croatia (from November 1991)

Croatian Police
Croatian Defence Forces
Strength
September 1991
145,000 troops
1,100 tanks
700 APCs
1,980 artillery pieces
September 1991
58,000 troops
January 1992
155,772 troops
216 tanks
127 APCs
1,108 artillery pieces
Casualties and losses
1,279 killed 3,761 killed
Civilian casualties: See the Aftermath section

The 1991 Yugoslav campaign in Croatia was a series of engagements between the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), the Yugoslav Navy and the Yugoslav Air Force, and the Croatian National Guard (ZNG) then the Croatian Army (HV) during the Croatian War of Independence. The JNA was originally deployed in order to preserve Yugoslavia, and the initial plan of the campaign entailed the military occupation of Croatia and the removal of the Croatian leadership elected in 1990. The JNA intervention was the culmination of its involvement in the confiscation of weapons from Croatia's Territorial Defence, and in the Croatian Serb revolt that had begun in August 1990. From that time, the JNA had been frequently deployed to form a buffer zone between the Croatian Serb guerrillas and the ZNG or the Croatian police. In effect, these JNA buffer zones often secured the territorial gains of the insurgents and led to an increasingly hostile relationship between the JNA and Croatia. The JNA campaign plan was amended shortly before the campaign to include the relief of JNA barracks besieged by the ZNG. The besieging and subsequent capture of several JNA facilities allowed Croatia to arm its previously poorly equipped military and to equip and recruit new ethnic Croat conscripts and officers of the Yugoslav People's Army.

The campaign effectively started on 20 September 1991, even though relatively minor offensive actions had already been undertaken. By the end of the month, it suffered from serious delays and manpower shortages caused by low call-up turnout in Serbia. In early October, the original campaign objectives were reduced as Serbian president Slobodan Milošević and his allies gained greater control of the JNA. Subsequently, the campaign objectives were redefined to deny the Croatian Government access to parts of Croatia that contained substantial Serb populations and to protect Croatian Serbs. The campaign culminated in late November and early December with the Battle of Vukovar and the Siege of Dubrovnik. A limited Croatian counterattack and the development of the Croatian Army led to a stalemate on the battlefield.

The strategic situation permitted the development of the Vance plan—a ceasefire supervised by United Nations peacekeepers designed to create conditions for the political settlement of the conflict in Croatia. The Sarajevo Agreement, regarding the implementation of the ceasefire, was signed on 2 January 1992, bringing the campaign to an end. Nonetheless, the JNA took several more months to withdraw from Croatia as it was replaced by the UN peacekeepers. In 1991 alone, the conflict caused more than 7,000 deaths and the internal displacement of 400,000–600,000 people. More than 1,700 persons remain missing as a result of the campaign.

  1. ^ CIA 2002, p. 106