2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine

2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine
Part of the Russo-Ukrainian War
Map of disturbances by region, indicating its peak severity
Date23 February – 2 May 2014 (2 months, 1 week and 2 days)
Location
Caused byRussia support of separatism, opposition to Euromaidan, success of the Revolution of Dignity and the pro-European outlook of the new government[1][2]
Goals
Methods
Resulted in

From the end of February 2014, in the aftermath of the Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity, which resulted in the ousting of Russian-leaning Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, demonstrations by Russian-backed,[6][7][8] pro-Russian, and anti-government groups (as well as pro-government demonstrations) took place in Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv and Odesa. The unrest, which was supported by the Russian military and intelligence services,[9] belongs to the early stages of the Russo-Ukrainian War.[10][11][12]

During its first phase[13] in February–March 2014, the Ukrainian territory of Crimea was invaded and subsequently annexed by Russia following an internationally unrecognized referendum, with the United Nations General Assembly voting in favor of Ukraine's territorial integrity.[14] Concurrently, protests by anti-Maidan and pro-Russian groups took place across other parts of eastern and southern Ukraine. Local separatists, some directed and financed by the Russian security services,[15] took advantage of the situation and occupied government buildings in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv oblasts in early March 2014. The Ukrainian government was able to quickly quell this unrest, and removed the separatists by 10 March.[16]

Eventually, Kharkiv, Odesa, and most parts of Donbas including Mariupol remained under Ukrainian government control. Russia-controlled DPR and LPR were formed and took control of Donetsk and Luhansk.[17] In the second phase from April 2014, armed Russian-backed groups seized government buildings across Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, together known as the Donbas, and launched a separatist insurgency in the region. To suppress this insurgency, the Ukrainian government began what it called an "Anti-Terrorist Operation" (ATO), sending in the armed forces to quell the unrest.[18] Unrest in Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts did not escalate into full-scale armed conflict, although dozens of mostly pro-Russian protestors were killed. Order was restored in these regions with the cooperation of the local civil authorities,[19] though pro-Russian disturbances, such as bombings, continued throughout the year.[20]

  1. ^ "Party of Regions, Communist Party banned in Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil regions". Kyiv Post. 27 January 2014. Retrieved 10 April 2014.
  2. ^ "Activity of Regions Party, Communist Party, Yanukovych's portraits banned in Drohobych". Kyiv Post. 21 February 2014. Retrieved 10 April 2014.
  3. ^ "East Ukraine separatists seek union with Russia". BBC News. 12 May 2014. Retrieved 12 May 2014.
  4. ^ a b "Pro-Russia Protesters Storm Donetsk Offices". NBC News. 16 March 2014. Retrieved 17 March 2014.
  5. ^ "Kharkiv regional council demands official status for Russian language". Interfax-Ukraine News Agency. 24 April 2014. Retrieved 25 April 2014.
  6. ^ "Pro-Russia protesters occupy regional government in Ukraine's Donetsk". Reuters. 3 March 2014. Retrieved 5 August 2023.
  7. ^ "Putin's Neo-Nazi Helpers". Human Rights in Ukraine. Retrieved 5 August 2023.
  8. ^ Malyarenko, Tetyana; Galbreath, David (2016). "Paramilitary motivation in Ukraine: beyond integration and abolition" (PDF). Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 16 (1): 113–138. doi:10.1080/14683857.2016.1148414. S2CID 56351688.
  9. ^ MIKHEIEVA, OKSANA (21 December 2021), "Motivations of Pro-Russian and Pro-Ukrainian Combatants in the Context of the Russian Military Intervention in the Donbas", The War in Ukraine’s Donbas, Central European University Press, pp. 67–82, doi:10.7829/j.ctv26jp68t.8, ISBN 9789633864203, S2CID 245625967, retrieved 5 August 2023
  10. ^ Kofman, Michael; Migacheva, Katya; Nichiporuk, Brian; Radin, Andrew; Tkacheva, Olesya; Oberholtzer, Jenny (2017). Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (PDF) (Report). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. pp. 33–34.
  11. ^ Mitrokhin, Nikolay (2015). "Infiltration, Instruction, Invasion: Russia's War in the Donbass" (PDF). Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society. 1 (1): 220–221. Archived from the original (PDF) on 11 June 2021. Retrieved 16 March 2022.
  12. ^ Wilson, Andrew (20 April 2016). "The Donbas in 2014: Explaining Civil Conflict Perhaps, but not Civil War". Europe-Asia Studies. 68 (4): 631–652. doi:10.1080/09668136.2016.1176994. ISSN 0966-8136. S2CID 148334453.
  13. ^ "From World War to Cold War", Russia’s Bitter Path to Modernity : A History of the Soviet and Post-Soviet Eras, Bloomsbury Academic, 2001, doi:10.5040/9781628929690.ch-010, ISBN 978-0-8264-1350-5, retrieved 5 August 2023
  14. ^ DeBenedictis, Kent (2021). Russian 'hybrid warfare' and the annexation of Crimea : the modern application of Soviet political warfare. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 1. ISBN 978-0-7556-4002-7. OCLC 1238134016.
  15. ^ Kuzio, Taras (2017). Putin's war against Ukraine: revolution, nationalism, and crime. North Charleston, South Carolina: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform. p. 252. ISBN 978-1-5432-8586-4. OCLC 982267595.
  16. ^ Kofman, Michael; Migacheva, Katya; Nichiporuk, Brian; Radin, Andrew; Tkacheva, Olesya; Oberholtzer, Jenny (2017). Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (PDF) (Report). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. pp. 37–38.
  17. ^ Puri, Samir (25 August 2022). Russia's Road to War with Ukraine: Invasion amidst the ashes of empires. Biteback Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78590-771-5. Crucially, Mariupol, Kharkiv and Odessa all remained firmly under Ukrainian government control, which meant that the actual DPR and LPR lands were not especially big at all, even if they held the major cities of Donetsk and Luhansk. ...
  18. ^ D'Anieri, Paul J. (2019). Ukraine and Russia : from civilized divorce to uncivil war. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. p. 234. ISBN 978-1-108-48609-5. OCLC 1097455586.
  19. ^ Kofman, Michael; Migacheva, Katya; Nichiporuk, Brian; Radin, Andrew; Tkacheva, Olesya; Oberholtzer, Jenny (2017). Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (PDF) (Report). Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. p. 39.
  20. ^ "Odessa Bombings Show Separatists' Limitations".