Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal | |
|---|---|
 Aehrenthal in 1907 | |
| Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary | |
| In office 24 October 1906 – 17 February 1912 | |
| Monarch | Franz Joseph I |
| Preceded by | Agenor Maria Gołuchowski |
| Succeeded by | Leopold Berchtold |
| Personal details | |
| Born | September 27, 1854 Groß Skal (Hrubá Skála), Bohemia, Austrian Empire |
| Died | 17 February 1912 (aged 57) Vienna, Austria-Hungary |
| Nationality | Austro-Hungarian |
| Profession | Diplomat |
Alois Leopold Johann Baptist Graf[1] Lexa von Aehrenthal (27 September 1854 – 17 February 1912) was a diplomat from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Biographer Solomon Wank says he exuded a strong monarchical-conservative outlook, loyalty to the Empire, and optimism regarding its ability to survive and flourish in the early 20th century. He is best known for promoting an energetic foreign policy in the Balkans, seeking cooperation with Russia and approval of Germany for actions that angered the South Slav element in the Balkans.[2]
As Imperial Foreign Minister, Aehrenthal formulated and executed the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and their integration into the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1908. With the annexation he sought to permanently block in the Balkan south of the empire the emergence of inter- and intra-ethnic nationalisms amongst the multiplicity of peoples there on the basis of their shared religious beliefs and ethnic affiliations. His actions precipitated an international crisis because he sought to achieve his objectives by negotiation of Russian acceptance of the annexation in exchange for Austro-Hungarian support for greater Russian access from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean through the Straits of the Dardanelles (at the expense of the Ottoman Empire), which Britain and France would supposedly accept since they had recently become allied with Russia.
Seeking to limit objections in Russia to any support for the annexation, Aehrenthal began secret negotiations with Russian foreign minister Alexander Izvolsky. The annexation ultimately damaged Austro-Russian collaboration on settling Balkan questions. Also, it stirred chauvinist popular emotion in Russia, which felt humiliated in a sphere of vital interest to it.[3][4]