Altruism theory of voting


The altruism theory of voting is a model of voter behavior which states that if citizens in a democracy have "social" preferences for the welfare of others, the extremely low probability of a single vote determining an election will be outweighed by the large cumulative benefits society will receive from the voter's preferred policy being enacted, such that it is rational for an “altruistic” citizen, who receives utility from helping others, to vote.[1] Altruistic voting has been compared to purchasing a lottery ticket, in which the probability of winning is extremely low but the payoff is large enough that the expected benefit outweighs the cost.[2]

Since the failure of standard rational choice models—which assume voters have "selfish" preferences—to explain voter turnout in large elections, public choice economists and social scientists have increasingly turned to altruism as a way to explain why rational individuals would choose to vote despite its apparent lack of individual benefit, explaining the paradox of voting. The theory suggests that individual voters do, in fact, derive personal utility from influencing the outcome of elections in favor of the candidate that they believe will implement policies for the greater good of the entire population.[3]

  1. ^ Edlin, Aaron, Andrew Gelman, and Noah Kaplan. "Voting as a Rational Choice: Why and How People Vote To Improve the Well-Being of Others." Rationality and Society. 19.3 (2008): 293–314. Web. 22 Oct. 2012.
  2. ^ Jankowski, Richard. "Buying a Lottery Ticket to Help the Poor: Altruism, Civic Duty, and Self-interest in the Decision to Vote." Rationality and Society 14.1 (2002): 55–77. Sage Journals. Web. 20 Oct. 2012.
  3. ^ Fowler, James H. "Altruism and Turnout." The Journal of Politics 68.3 (2006): 673–83. JSTOR. Web. 20 Oct. 2012.