Battle of Longewala | |||||||
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Part of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 | |||||||
Tank tracks at Longewala. Photographic reconnaissance image taken at the time showing the desperate last-minute manoeuvres by Pakistani tanks in the Longewala sector. Circles show destroyed Pakistani tanks. | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
India | Pakistan | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Units involved | |||||||
14th BSF Battalion (attached to 23rd Punjab)[4] 122 Squadron | |||||||
Strength | |||||||
1 Company (120 personnel) accompanied by half a platoon (6-7 border guards)[5][6] |
2 Mobile infantry brigade (2,000–3,000 personnel)[8][9] | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
2 personnel killed[10][11] |
200 personnel killed[10] | ||||||
The Battle of Longewala (4–7 December 1971) was one of the first major engagements in the western sector during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, fought between assaulting Pakistani forces and Indian defenders at the Indian border post of Longewala, in the Thar Desert of Rajasthan. The battle was fought between 120 Indian soldiers accompanied by four Hawker Hunter and three HAL Marut fighter-bombers and 2,000–3,000 Pakistani soldiers accompanied by 30–40 tanks.
A company of the Indian Army's 23rd Battalion, Punjab Regiment, commanded by Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri a Sikh Gujjar, was left with the choice of either attempting to hold out until reinforced, or fleeing on foot from a Pakistani mechanized infantry force.[12] Choosing the former, Chandpuri ensured that all his assets were correctly deployed and made the best use of his strong defensive position, as well as weaknesses created by errors in enemy tactics. He was also fortunate that an Indian Air Force forward air controller was able to secure and direct aircraft in support of the post's defence until reinforcements arrived six hours later.[13]
The Pakistani commanders made several questionable decisions, including a failure of their strategic intelligence to foresee the availability of Indian fighter-bombers in the Longewala area, exercising operational mobility with little or no route reconnaissance, and conducting a tactical frontal assault with no engineer reconnaissance.[14][13] That led to the Pakistani brigade group being left extremely vulnerable to air attack and vehicles becoming bogged in terrain unsuitable for the movement of armoured vehicles, as they tried to deploy off a single track and were more susceptible to enemy fire since they used external fuel storage in tactical combat and attempted to execute a night attack over unfamiliar terrain, and infantry was surprised by obstacles to troop movement, which caused confusion and stalling the attack during the crucial hours of darkness, when the assaulting infantry still had a measure of concealment from Indian small arms and infantry support weapon fire.[14]