| Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued February 7, 1946 Decided February 25, 1946 | |
| Full case name | Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. |
| Citations | 327 U.S. 251 (more) 66 S. Ct. 574; 90 L. Ed. 652 |
| Case history | |
| Subsequent | Rehearing denied, 327 U.S. 817 (1946). |
| Holding | |
| A damage award does not need to be mathematically precise, but it must be a just and reasonable estimate based on the evidence presented, and not based on speculation. Can use yardstick or before & after, but must be careful to use comparable data. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Stone |
| Dissent | Frankfurter |
| Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. | |
| Laws applied | |
| Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 and 7; Clayton Act, §§ 4 and 16 | |
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court allowing an action to recover compensatory damages under the antitrust statutes. The jury had returned a verdict for $120,000 in petitioner's favor, covering a five-year period where plaintiff suffered due to respondents' antitrust conspiracy. The trial court, sitting in the Northern District of Illinois, gave judgment for treble damages, as prescribed by § 4 of the Clayton Act. The 7th Circuit reversed on the sole ground that the evidence of damage was not sufficient for submission to the jury, and directed the entry of judgment for respondents non obstante veredicto (notwithstanding the verdict).[1] The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the evidence of damage was sufficient to support the verdict. Respondents argued that any measure of damages would be too speculative and uncertain to afford an accurate measure of the amount of the damage.[2] The Supreme Court disagreed, not wanting to let the respondent defeat a remedy because its antitrust violation was so effective and complete. The Court held that the jury could return a verdict for the plaintiffs, even though damages could not be measured with the exactness which would otherwise have been possible, so long as the jury made a "just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant data".[3] The judgment of the district court was affirmed and the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed.