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The Borda method or order of merit is a positional voting rule that gives each candidate a number of points equal to the number of candidates ranked below them: the lowest-ranked candidate gets 0 points, the second-lowest gets 1 point, and so on. Once all votes have been counted, the option or candidate or candidates with the most points is/are the winner or winners.
The Borda count was developed independently several times, being first proposed in 1435 by Nicholas of Cusa (see History below),[1][2][note 1] but is named after the 18th-century French mathematician and naval engineer Jean-Charles de Borda, who devised the system in 1770.[3]
The Borda count is well-known in social choice theory for both its pleasant theoretical properties and its ease of manipulation. In the absence of strategic voting and strategic nomination, the Borda count tends to elect broadly-acceptable options or candidates (rather than consistently following the preferences of a majority);[4] when both voting and nomination patterns are completely random, the Borda count generally has an exceptionally high social utility efficiency.[5] However, the method is highly vulnerable to spoiler effects when there are clusters of similar candidates.[5] In particular, some implementations' treatment of equal-rank or truncated ballots can incentivize turkey-raising strategies.[6][7]
As well, the Borda count method does not necessarily produce minority representation even if a minority voting block has the equivalent of the Hare quota. This was noticed in 1902 when a similar method was put forward by L.B. Tuckerman of Cleveland.[8]
The traditional Borda method is currently used to elect two ethnic minority members of the National Assembly of Slovenia,[7] in modified forms to determine which candidates are elected to the party list seats in Icelandic parliamentary elections,[citation needed] and for selecting presidential election candidates in Kiribati.[9] A variant known as the Dowdall system is used to elect members of the Parliament of Nauru.[10] Until the early 1970s, another variant was used in Finland to select individual candidates within party lists.[citation needed] It is also widely used throughout the world by various private organizations and competitions.
The Quota Borda system is a proportional multiwinner variant.
- ^ Emerson, Peter (16 January 2016). From Majority Rule to Inclusive Politics. Springer. ISBN 978-3-319-23500-4.
- ^ Emerson, Peter (1 February 2013). "The original Borda count and partial voting". Social Choice and Welfare. 40 (2): 353–358. doi:10.1007/s00355-011-0603-9. ISSN 0176-1714. S2CID 29826994.
- ^ McLean, Urken & Hewitt 1995, p. 81.
- ^ Lippman, David. "Voting Theory" (PDF). Math in Society.
Borda count is sometimes described as a consensus-based voting system, since it can sometimes choose a more broadly acceptable option over the one with majority support.
- ^ a b Cite error: The named reference
:0was invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ Cite error: The named reference
:02was invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ a b "Slovenia's electoral law". www.minelres.lv. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 15 June 2009.
- ^ "The Tuckerman method". Proportional Representation Review (March 1902): 19–20.
- ^ Reilly, Benjamin (2002). "Social Choice in the South Seas: Electoral Innovation and the Borda Count in the Pacific Island Countries". International Political Science Review. 23 (4): 364–366. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.924.3992. doi:10.1177/0192512102023004002. S2CID 3213336.
- ^ Fraenkel, Jon; Grofman, Bernard (3 April 2014). "The Borda Count and its real-world alternatives: Comparing scoring rules in Nauru and Slovenia". Australian Journal of Political Science. 49 (2): 186–205. doi:10.1080/10361146.2014.900530. S2CID 153325225.
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