Action by a state to compel international entities to do (or not) something
In international relations, coercion refers to the imposition of costs by a state on other states and non-state actors to prevent them from taking an action (deterrence) or to compel them to take an action (compellence).[1][2][3] Coercion frequently takes the form of threats or the use of limited military force.[4] It is commonly seen as analytically distinct from persuasion (which may not necessarily involve the imposition of costs), brute force (which may not be intended to shape the adversary's behavior), or full-on war (which involves the use of full military force).[1][5][3]
Coercion takes the form of either deterrence or compellence. Compellence has been characterized as harder to successfully implement than deterrence because of difficulties in getting actors to withdraw actions.[3][2] One influential typology of coercion distinguishes between strategies to punish an adversary, raise the risk for an adversary, or deny the adversary from achieving their objectives.[3][2] Successful instances of coercive diplomacy in one case may have a deterrent effect on other states,[6][7][3] whereas a reputation for a lack of resolve may undermine general deterrence[8] and future compellence.[9]
Successful coercive diplomacy entails clearly communicated threats, a cost-benefit calculus, credibility, and reassurance.[10] It frequently revolves around a demonstration of capabilities and resolve, both of which enhance the credibility of attempts to coerce others. Scholars have identified several factors as contributing to successful coercion, such as power, interests,[11] reputation,[8][9] credibility, resolve, and ability to signal.[12]
^Byman, Daniel and Matthew Waxman. The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might New York. Cambridge University Press. 2002.