Cognitive-experiential self-theory

Cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST) is a dual-process model of perception developed by Seymour Epstein. CEST is based around the idea that people operate using two separate systems for information processing: analytical-rational and intuitive-experiential. The analytical-rational system is deliberate, slow, and logical. The intuitive-experiential system is fast, automatic, and emotionally driven. These are independent systems that operate in parallel and interact to produce behavior and conscious thought.[1]

There have been other dual-process theories in the past. Shelly Chaiken's heuristic-systematic model, Carl Jung's distinction between thinking and feeling, and John Bargh's theory on automatic vs. non-automatic processing all have similar components to CEST. However, Epstein's cognitive-experiential self-theory is unique in that it places a dual-process model within the context of a global theory of personality, rather than considering it as an isolated construct or cognitive shortcut.[1][2] Epstein argues that within the context of day-to-day life, a constant interaction occurs between the two systems. Because the experiential system is fast, guided by emotion and past experience, and requires little in terms of cognitive resources, it is especially equipped to handle the majority of information processing on a daily basis, all of which occurs outside of conscious awareness. This, in turn, allows us to focus the limited capacity of our rational system on whatever requires our conscious attention at the time.[1]

Individual differences in preference for analytical or experiential processing can be measured using the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI). The REI measures the two independent processing modes with two factors: need for cognition (rational measure) and faith in intuition (experiential measure). Several studies have confirmed that the REI is a reliable measure of individual differences in information processing, and that the two independent thinking styles measured account for a substantial amount of variance that is not addressed by other personality theories[3] such as the five factor model.[4]

  1. ^ a b c Epstein, Seymour; In: Handbook of psychology: Personality and social psychology, Vol. 5. Millon, Theodore (Ed.); Lerner, Melvin J. (Ed.); Hoboken, NJ, US: John Wiley & Sons Inc, 2003. pp. 159–184. [Chapter]
  2. ^ Pacini, R., Epstein, S. (1999). The relation of rational and experiential information processing styles to personality, basic beliefs, and the ratio-bias phenomenon. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,76, 972–987.
  3. ^ Epstein, S.; Pacini, R.; Denes-Raj, V. & Heier, H. (1996). "Individual differences in intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking styles". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 71 (2): 390–405. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.71.2.390. PMID 8765488.
  4. ^ Norris, P. & Epstein, S. (2011). "An experiential thinking style: Its facets and relations with objective and subjective criterion measures". Journal of Personality. 79 (5): 1044–1080. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2011.00718.x. PMID 21241307.