Consumer welfare standard

Competition law
Basic concepts
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Anti-competitive practices
Monopolization Collusion Formation of cartels Price fixing (cases) Bid rigging Tacit collusion Occupational licensing Product bundling and tying Refusal to deal Group boycott Essential facilities Exclusive dealing Dividing territories Occupational closure Predatory pricing Misuse of patents and copyrights Regulatory capture Rent-seeking
Enforcement authorities and organizations
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In the context of U.S. competition law, the consumer welfare standard (CWS) or consumer welfare principle (CWP)^[1] is a legal doctrine used to determine the applicability of antitrust enforcement.

Under the consumer welfare standard, a corporate merger is deemed anti-competitive “only when it harms both allocative efficiency and raises the prices of goods above competitive levels or diminishes their quality".^[2] This contrasts with earlier frameworks of antitrust theory, and more recently the New Brandeis movement, which argue that corporate mergers are inherently detrimental to consumers because of the diminishing competition resulting from it.

In other words, the consumer welfare standard does not analyze antitrust issues from a "big is bad"^[3] perspective that condemns corporate consolidation as a negative phenomenon in of itself. Instead, the framework stipulates that corporate consolidation is not necessarily harmful to consumers, as long as a merger (or series of mergers) does not lead to individuals having to pay more for a product or service.