Dolan v. City of Tigard | |
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Argued March 23, 1994 Decided June 24, 1994 | |
Full case name | Florence Dolan, Petitioner v. City of Tigard |
Citations | 512 U.S. 374 (more) 114 S. Ct. 2309; 129 L. Ed. 2d 304; 1994 U.S. LEXIS 4826 |
Case history | |
Prior | Appeal from the Supreme Court of Oregon, 854 P.2d 437 (1993); cert. granted, 510 U.S. 989 (1993). |
Holding | |
The city's zoning ordinance was not roughly proportionate to the city's public purpose in such a way to justify infringing upon the property owner's rights. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Rehnquist, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas |
Dissent | Stevens, joined by Blackmun, Ginsburg |
Dissent | Souter |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. V |
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), more commonly Dolan v. Tigard, is a United States Supreme Court case.[1] It is a landmark case regarding the practice of zoning and property rights, and has served to establish limits on the ability of cities and other government agencies to use zoning and land-use regulations to compel property owners to make unrelated public improvements as a condition to getting zoning approval, citing the violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.[2][3]