Elgin v. Department of Treasury | |
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Argued February 27, 2012 Decided June 11, 2012 | |
Full case name | Michael B. Elgin, et al., Petitioners v. Department of the Treasury, et al. |
Citations | 567 U.S. 1 (more) 132 S. Ct. 2126, 183 L. Ed. 2d 1, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 4461, 115 FEP Cases 257, 33 IER Cases 1505, 80 U.S.L.W. 4417 |
Case history | |
Prior | Appeal of removal dismissed, unpublished (MSPB); partial summary judgment granted sub nom. Elgin v. United States, 594 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D. Mass. 2009); reconsidered and vacated, 697 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D. Mass. 2010); affirmed, 641 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2011); cert. granted, 565 U.S. 962 (2011). |
Holding | |
The CSRA gives exclusive jurisdiction to suits rising under the act to the MSPB, with appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and further appeals to the Supreme Court. Federal District Courts cannot rule on issues regarding the act or on adverse employment actions of the federal departments. The MSPB can hear constitutional arguments for adverse employment actions. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Thomas, joined by Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor |
Dissent | Alito, joined by Ginsburg, Kagan |
Laws applied | |
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978; 5 U.S.C. § §3328; 5 U.S.C. § §7512 |
Elgin v. Department of the Treasury, 567 U.S. 1 (2012), was a United States Supreme Court case where the Court ruled that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) gives exclusive jurisdiction for claims under the Act to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.[1] Additionally, the Court held that the Act bars federal district courts from ruling on matters related to the act including adverse employment actions of the federal departments, and allows the Merit Systems Protection Board to hear constitutional arguments for wrongful employee severance and adverse employment actions.[2] It was a 6–3 decision, with the majority opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas. The case greatly limited the recourse of federal employees to the courts for adverse employment practices, allowing such recourse only to a few, specific courts as aforementioned.