Elkins v. United States

Elkins v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued March 28–29, 1960 Decided June 27, 1960
Full case name	James Butler Elkins and Raymond Frederick Clark v. United States of America
Citations	364 U.S. 206 (more) 80 S. Ct. 1437; 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669; 1960 U.S. LEXIS 1989
Case history
Prior	266 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1959); cert. granted, 361 U.S. 810 (1959).
Subsequent	New trial ordered on remand, 195 F. Supp. 757 (D. Or. 1961).
Holding
Evidence gathered by state or local authorities is inadmissible in federal court if it was gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment
Court membership
Chief Justice Earl Warren Associate Justices Hugo Black · Felix Frankfurter William O. Douglas · Tom C. Clark John M. Harlan II · William J. Brennan Jr. Charles E. Whittaker · Potter Stewart
Case opinions
Majority	Stewart, joined by Warren, Black, Douglas, Brennan
Dissent	Frankfurter, joined by Harlan, Clark, Whittaker
Dissent	Harlan, joined by Clark, Whittaker
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. IV
This case overturned a previous ruling or rulings
Lustig v. United States (1949)

Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), was a US Supreme Court decision that held the "silver platter doctrine", which allowed federal prosecutors to use evidence illegally gathered by state police, to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.^[1]

Evidence of illegal wiretapping had been seized from the home of James Butler Elkins by Portland, Oregon police officers on an unrelated search warrant, and he was subsequently convicted in federal court. Elkins appealed, arguing that evidence found by the officers should have been inadmissible under the exclusionary rule, which forbids the introduction of most evidence gathered through Fourth Amendment violations in criminal court.

In a 5–4 decision, the Court overturned the silver platter doctrine and Elkins' conviction. Associate Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority opinion, while Associate Justices Felix Frankfurter and John M. Harlan II dissented. By giving a rationale for a broader interpretation of Fourth Amendment rights, the decision prepared the way for Mapp v. Ohio (1961), which applied the exclusionary rule to the states.