False consensus effect

In psychology, the false consensus effect, also known as consensus bias, is a pervasive cognitive bias that causes people to "see their own behavioral choices and judgments as relatively common and appropriate to existing circumstances".[1] In other words, they assume that their personal qualities, characteristics, beliefs, and actions are relatively widespread through the general population.

This false consensus is significant because it increases self-esteem (overconfidence effect). It can be derived from a desire to conform and be liked by others in a social environment. This bias is especially prevalent in group settings where one thinks the collective opinion of their own group matches that of the larger population. Since the members of a group reach a consensus and rarely encounter those who dispute it, they tend to believe that everybody thinks the same way. The false-consensus effect is not restricted to cases where people believe that their values are shared by the majority, but it still manifests as an overestimate of the extent of their belief.[2]

Additionally, when confronted with evidence that a consensus does not exist, people often assume that those who do not agree with them are defective in some way.[3] There is no single cause for this cognitive bias; the availability heuristic, self-serving bias, and naïve realism have been suggested as at least partial underlying factors. The bias may also result, at least in part, from non-social stimulus-reward associations.[4] Maintenance of this cognitive bias may be related to the tendency to make decisions with relatively little information.[5] When faced with uncertainty and a limited sample from which to make decisions, people often "project" themselves onto the situation. When this personal knowledge is used as input to make generalizations, it often results in the false sense of being part of the majority.[6]

The false consensus effect has been widely observed and supported by empirical evidence. Previous research has suggested that cognitive and perceptional factors (motivated projection, accessibility of information, emotion, etc.) may contribute to the consensus bias, while recent studies have focused on its neural mechanisms. One recent study has shown that consensus bias may improve decisions about other people's preferences.[4] Ross, Green and House first defined the false consensus effect in 1977 with emphasis on the relative commonness that people perceive about their own responses; however, similar projection phenomena had already caught attention in psychology. Specifically, concerns with respect to connections between individual's personal predispositions and their estimates of peers appeared in the literature for a while. For instances, Katz and Allport in 1931 illustrated that students’ estimates of the amount of others on the frequency of cheating was positively correlated to their own behavior. Later, around 1970, same phenomena were found on political beliefs and prisoner's dilemma situation. In 2017, researchers identified a persistent egocentric bias when participants learned about other people's snack-food preferences.[4] Moreover, recent studies suggest that the false consensus effect can also affect professional decision makers; specifically, it has been shown that even experienced marketing managers project their personal product preferences onto consumers.[7][8]

  1. ^ Ross, Greene & House 1977.
  2. ^ Choi, Incheol; Cha, Oona (2019). "Cross-Cultural Examination of the False Consensus Effect". Frontiers in Psychology. 10: 2747. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02747. PMC 6917617. PMID 31920804.
  3. ^ Dean, Jeremy (2007). "Why We All Stink as Intuitive Psychologists: The False Consensus Bias". PsyBlog. Retrieved 2007-11-13.
  4. ^ a b c Tarantola et al. 2017.
  5. ^ Dawes, R.M. (1 April 1990). The potential nonfalsity of the false consensus effect, Insights in decision making: A tribute to Hillel J. Einhorn. University of Chicago Press. pp. 179–199.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  6. ^ Myers 2015, p. 38.
  7. ^ Herzog, Walter; Hattula, Johannes D.; Dahl, Darren W. (2021). "Marketers project their personal preferences onto consumers: Overcoming the threat of egocentric decision making". Journal of Marketing Research. 58 (3): 456–475. doi:10.1177/0022243721998378.
  8. ^ Hattula, Johannes D.; Herzog, Walter; Dahl, Darren W.; Reinecke, Sven (2015). "Managerial empathy facilitates egocentric predictions of consumer preferences" (PDF). Journal of Marketing Research. 52 (2): 235–252. doi:10.1509/jmr.13.0296. S2CID 55095579.