| Galloway v. United States | |
|---|---|
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| Submitted June 15, 1938 Argued March 9, 1943 Decided May 24, 1943 | |
| Full case name | Galloway v. United States |
| Citations | 319 U.S. 372 (more) 63 S. Ct. 1077; 87 L. Ed. 1458 |
| Holding | |
| History and precedent support the conclusion that the Seventh Amendment was designed to preserve a jury trial in civil cases in instances of the most fundamental elements. Here, speculation could not substitute for probative facts. It was the Petitioner's burden to show by nature of the claim that he suffered from continuing and total disability for nearly twenty years. His inability to show the continuing disability, as per the statute, left his claim vague and incomplete and therefore properly subjected to a directed verdict. | |
| Court membership | |
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| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Rutledge, joined by Stone, Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson |
| Dissent | Black, joined by Douglas, Murphy |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. amend. VII | |
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943), was a Supreme Court of the United States decision in which the Court determined that a directed verdict in a civil case does not deprive litigants of their right to a trial by jury in civil cases under the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Galloway, the petitioner, had an on and off history with the Army and Navy. In 1930 he began a series of medical examinations with the Veterans' Bureau which labeled him as having psychosis. The petitioner claimed that he was now totally and permanently disabled by reason of insanity brought about by the strain of active service abroad. Petitioner alleged that his insanity had existed before May 31, 1919, the day on which his yearly renewable term insurance policy lapsed for nonpayment of the premium. To prove his case, Petitioner offered a series of six witnesses who knew him before and after service and would comment on his behavioral change. The Petitioner's burden was to demonstrate by more than speculative inference that his condition began on or before May 31, 1919 and continuously existed or progressed until 1930. The Government moved for a directed verdict and the District Court granted it in favor of the Government stating Petitioner did not meet his burden with the evidence he presented. Petitioner claimed the directed verdict denied him his right to a jury trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's ruling. The issue in this case was whether a directed verdict denied the Petitioner the right to a jury trial.