Generic views

The principal of generic views in the study of cognition stipulates that the interpretation made by an observer of a distal phenomenon should be such as to not require that the observer be in a special position to, or relationship with, the phenomenon in question. The principal is a fairly general account of the inductive bias that allows an observer to reconstruct distal phenomena from an impoverished proximal datum. This principle has been advanced particularly in vision research as an account of how, for example, three-dimensional structure is extracted from an inadequate two-dimensional projection.

The principal of generic views has been discussed by Richards[1] and Hoffman[2][n 1], and has been given a sophisticated Bayesian formalization by Freeman[citation needed].

  1. ^ Knill, D. C., & Richards, W., eds., Perception as Bayesian Inference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 478.
  2. ^ Gefter, A., "The Case Against Reality", The Atlantic, Apr. 25, 2016.


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