Grady v. Corbin | |
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Argued March 21, 1990 Decided May 29, 1990 | |
Full case name | William V. Grady, District Attorney of Dutchess County v. Thomas J. Corbin |
Citations | 495 U.S. 508 (more) 110 S. Ct. 2084; 109 L. Ed. 2d 548; 1990 U.S. LEXIS 2698 |
Case history | |
Prior | Writ of prohibition granted, Corbin v. Hillery, 74 N.Y.2d 279, 543 N.E.2d 714, 545 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1989); cert. granted, 493 U.S. 953 (1989). |
Holding | |
The Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Brennan, joined by White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens |
Dissent | O'Connor |
Dissent | Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, Kennedy |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. V | |
Overruled by | |
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993) |
Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), was a United States Supreme Court decision holding that: "the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted."[1]