| Holloway v. United States | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued November 9, 1998 Decided March 2, 1999 | |
| Full case name | Francois Holloway, a.k.a. Abdu Ali v. United States |
| Citations | 526 U.S. 1 (more) 119 S. Ct. 966; 143 L. Ed. 2d 1 |
| Case history | |
| Prior | United States v. Arnold, 126 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1997); cert. granted, 523 U.S. 1093 (1998). |
| Holding | |
| The federal carjacking law does apply to carjacking crimes committed by defendants with the "conditional intent" of harming drivers who resist the highjacker. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Stevens, joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer |
| Dissent | Scalia |
| Dissent | Thomas |
| Laws applied | |
| 526 U.S. 1 (1999) | |
Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the court addressed the issue of whether the federal carjacking law applies to crimes committed with the "conditional intent" of harming drivers who refuse a carjacker's demands.[1]
Federal law considers the act of hijacking an automobile as carjacking only if the hijacker did so with the intent to kill or inflict serious bodily harm to the driver of the car.[2]
- ^ "Holloway v. United States". oyez.org. Retrieved February 14, 2008.
- ^ Yaffe, Gideon (2004). "Conditional Intent and Mens Rea". Legal Theory. 10 (4). Cambridge Journal: 273–310. doi:10.1017/S135232520404025X. S2CID 54801893. Retrieved February 15, 2008.