Illinois v. Gates | |
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Argued October 10, 1982 Reargued March 1, 1983 Decided June 8, 1983 | |
Full case name | Illinois v. Gates et ux. |
Citations | 462 U.S. 213 (more) 103 S. Ct. 2317; 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 |
Case history | |
Prior | 85 Ill. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887; cert. granted, 454 U.S. 1140 (1982). |
Holding | |
The rigid "two-pronged test" under Aguilar and Spinelli for determining whether an informant's tip establishes probable cause for issuance of a warrant is abandoned, and the "totality of the circumstances" approach that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations is substituted in its place. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Rehnquist, joined by Burger, Blackmun, Powell, O'Connor |
Concurrence | White (in judgment) |
Dissent | Brennan, joined by Marshall |
Dissent | Stevens, joined by Brennan |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. IV | |
This case overturned a previous ruling or rulings | |
Aguilar v. Texas (1964) Spinelli v. United States (1969) |
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), is a Fourth Amendment case.[1] Gates overruled Aguilar v. Texas[2] and Spinelli v. United States,[3] thereby replacing the Aguilar–Spinelli test for probable cause with the "totality of the circumstances" test.